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General equilibrium models of  the United States economy have grown 
much more realistic in the last few years (the late 1970s and early 1980s), 
becoming more disaggregated and using more recent and extensive data 
on differences in behavior among individual consumers and producers. 
Serious attempts have been made using these models to simulate the 
effects  of  several proposed  tax changes, including integration  of  the 
corporate with the personal income tax and replacement of  the income 
tax with a consumption tax. However, in attempting to capture the effects 
of  the government on the economy, these models have generally assumed 
for simplicity that marginal tax rates equal the observed average tax rates 
and that marginal benefit rates are zero. 
The main purpose of  this paper is to derive improved estimates of 
various marginal tax rates and to take into account certain offsetting 
marginal benefits. We use the  general equilibrium tax model of Fullerton, 
Shoven, and Whalley (1978, 1980, hereafter FSW) as a starting point for 
this remodeling effort. Most important, we include in the model recent 
theories developed in Gordon (1980) concerning the effects of  combined 
corporate and personal  taxes on firms’ financial and capital intensity 
decisions. We also apply the same theoretical approach to the modeling 
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of  governmental financial and capital intensity decisions. This approach 
takes explicit account of  uncertainty, the flexibility of  corporate financial 
policy, and inflation. In addition, we briefly reexamine the modeling of 
the property tax, unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation, 
and social security. 
To  test the importance of  the above changes in the modeling of govern- 
ment-induced distortions, we resimulate the effects of  the integration of 
corporate  with personal income taxes. We find, contrary  to  FSW, that the 
welfare gains of lessening tax distortions through integration are more 
than offset by the welfare losses resulting from raising tax rates on labor 
income in order to replace lost revenue. This result is particularly strong 
because FSW included only intertemporal and interindustry allocation 
welfare gains, whereas we allow further welfare gains from eliminating 
the tax distortion which favors debt finance. 
The organization of  the paper is as follows. In section 11.1 we reex- 
amine some of  the marginal distortions created by the various taxes on 
labor. In section 11.2 we describe our modeling of  the effects of corporate 
and personal taxes on firms’ financial and investment decisions. We also 
describe here the construction of  the data needed to calculate the new 
industry-specific marginal costs of capital. Section 11.3 describes a few 
other adjustments in the model made necessary by  the change in the 
modeling of  taxes on capital income. Finally, section 11.4 describes the 
simulation procedure and the results from our resimulation of corporate 
tax integration using our revised general equilibrium model. 
11.1  Changes in the Modeling of Tax Distortions on Labor Income 
While FSW carefully measure the size of  the various taxes that apply to 
labor income, they ignore the fact that higher tax payments are often 
associated with larger transfer receipts. In particular, benefits are closely 
associated with tax payments  in the social security program, in unemploy- 
ment insurance, and in workmen’s compensation. The taxes from these 
programs are distorting only to  the degree that marginal taxes differ from 
marginal benefits. We discuss each of  these programs in turn. 
We do not attempt to take into account in this paper other transfer 
programs, such as  food stamps, public housing, and AFDC, where bene- 
fits also create an implicit tax on labor income. We model these transfers 
as though they are paid in a lump-sum fashion, as did FSW. As a result, 
we may underestimate the welfare costs of increases in tax rates on labor 
income.’ 
1. This underestimation of  welfare losses from the replacement tax serves to strengthen 
our result  that  this welfare  loss  more  than offsets welfare gains from integration, as 
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11.1.1  Social Security 
The effect of  current labor supply on future social security benefits is 
very complicated, as described in Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980). The 
present value of marginal benefits arising from further work will exceed 
marginal  taxes for older men  (at least  as old  as sixty-five) but  will 
probably fall short of  marginal taxes for the very elderly, for younger 
workers, and for most women. However, we have insufficient informa- 
tion to capture this diversity of  net distortions. We would need to know 
the sex composition  and age of  workers  in  each industry  as well  as 
individuals in each consumer group. Instead, in the simulations below, 
we assume that the average net distortion from social security is zero, on 
the assumption that those facing a net subsidy come close to counterbal- 
ancing those who face a net tax. Since we therefore omit from the model 
the diverse distortions on individual labor supply created by social secu- 
rity, we may further underestimate the welfare costs of  tax increases on 
labor income. 
11.1.2  Unemployment Insurance 
Most  state unemployment  insurance programs  use  a  reserve  ratio 
formula to set the firm’s tax rate. This formula tries to ensure that the tax 
payments made by the firm just match the benefits received by its former 
workers. When this happens, workers anticipate future benefits equal in 
value to the taxes they currently pay, so the program should not distort 
labor supply decisions. For a discussion of  the law and some remaining 
distortions, see Brown (1980). 
However, state unemployment  insurance  programs also set a max- 
imum and minimum  tax rate on each firm. When a firm is at such a 
constraint, its workers should anticipate receiving either more or less in 
benefits, on average, than they currently pay in taxes, implying a net tax 
or  subsidy. The degree to  which this happens does differ systematically by 
industry. Becker (1972) examined the net transfers among industries in 
several states during the 1950s and 1960s and calculated  a net tax or 
subsidy rate for many industries.*  The appendix describes how we obtain 
labor tax rates for our industry classification from Becker’s classification. 
Table 11.1, column 1, reports the resulting net unemployment insurance 
tax rates by industry. 
11.1.3  Workmen’s Compensation 
The final change we made was to assume that workmen’s compensation 
programs  are nondistorting.  While such programs are normally  man- 
dated by the government, the cost of  the program to each firm is typically 
2. For a discussion of  the interindustry labor misallocations and general equilibrium 
incidence effects caused by this taxhbsidy system, see McLure (1977). Table 11.1  Data Used in  Calculating Tax Rates 
Labor 
Tax Rate  I,*  Y  8,  k  d 
All Industries  ,002  ,005  ,399  ,079  ,021  ,036  .004 
(1)  Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
(2) Mining 
(3) Crude petroleum and gas 
(4) Construction 
(5)  Food and tobacco 
(6) Textile, apparel, and leather 
(7) Paper and printing 
(8) Petroleum refining 
(9) Chemicals and rubber 
(10)  Lumber, furniture, stone, clay, and glass 
(1  1)  Metals and machinery 
(12) Transportation equipment 
(13) Motor vehicles 
(14) Transportation, communication, and utilities 
(15) Trade 
(16) Finance and insurance 
(17) Real estate 
(18)  Services 
-  ,035 
-  ,006 
-  ,006 
-  ,023 
-  ,004 
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*Note that f,,  is half of  the average property tax payment rate in each industry except real estate. 
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negotiated with a private insurance company. Competition among insur- 
ance companies implies that expected taxes and benefits ought to be 
equal for each firm. There are a few public programs, but these corre- 
spond closely in form to the private programs, and should therefore be 
nearly nondistorting as well. 
11.2  Tax Distortions Affecting Firms’ Financial 
and Investment Decisions 
In the FSW  model, corporate financial policy  is  exogenous,  while 
capital intensity decisions are distorted by a marginal tax rate set equal to 
the observed average tax rate on capital income, calculated separately by 
industry. The average tax rate in each industry is set equal to  the ratio of 
corporate, personal, and property tax payments  in 1973 to capital income 
in that year. Capital is then allocated such that the rate of return to capital 
net of  taxes and depreciation is equated in all industries. 
This approach conveniently abstracts from the many detailed provi- 
sions of  the United States tax law. However, it has many problems. Most 
immediately,  the measured average tax rate depends critically  on the 
measure for true earnings to capital. This latter number is difficult to 
calculate appropriately in any year and varies greatly from year to year. 
This variation implies that there is substantial measurement error in the 
calculated tax rates. In this paper, we instead model the tax law directly 
and calculate the cost of  capital implied by the prevailing market interest 
rate and the existing tax law. While this procedure requires many new 
data in order to characterize the tax law by industry, it does not require 
capital income and tax payment figures, which can fluctuate sharply from 
year to year. 
A more important reason for our remodeling, however, is that the 
explicit model of the effect of taxes on capital intensity decisions implies 
that marginal tax distortions differ dramatically from average tax rates, 
even if  all figures can be measured  without error. In this model, the 
government shares in the risk in the return to capital since its tax revenue 
is stochastic. The benefits to the firm of  transferring to the government 
some of  the risk in the return to its capital is not taken into account when 
calculating an average tax rate. This offsetting benefit turns out to be very 
important. 
In addition to explicitly modeling a firm’s capital intensity decisions, we 
model  simultaneously  how  taxes  affect  the  firm’s  optimal  financial 
p01icy.~  We  assume that firms choose a debt-equity ratio which minimizes 
their cost  of  capital, trading  off  the tax  advantages  of  debt against 
bankruptcy or other leverage-related costs. These leverage-related costs 
3. For an earlier introduction of an endogenous debt-equity decision into a Harberger 
(1962) style general equilibrium model, see Ballentine and McLure (1981). 374  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
are real costs which profit-maximizing  firms will choose to bear in order to 
save taxes and are part of the distortion costs created by the existing taxes 
on capital income. 
In our model of  both  financial and capital intensity decisions, we 
explicitly model both uncertainty and inflation. The basic model, a gener- 
alization of the capital asset pricing model, is developed in Gordon and 
Bradford (  1980).4  It is further analyzed in Gordon and Malkiel(l980) and 
in Gordon (1980). In the next two sections, we briefly describe how in this 
model corporate financial and capital intensity decisions depend on the 
tax law. 
11.2.1 
The tax law treats the returns to bonds and equity differently. First, 
only payments to bondholders are deductible from the corporate tax 
base. Counterbalancing this, however, the personal income tax is gener- 
ally higher on income from bonds, since much of the income from equity 
is in the form of  capital gains, which are taxed more lightly. Let (1 -  a) 
represent the effective personal tax rate on nominal income earned from 
stocks, (1 -  (Yb) the effective personal tax rate on interest income from 
bonds, T the corporate tax rate, and r the nominal interest rate paid on 
bonds. Then if  the firm were to issue another dollar of debt and use the 
proceeds  to repurchase a dollar of  equity  (holding the capital stock 
unchanged),  the  change  in  after-tax  income  to  investors  would  be 
abr -  ar(1 -  T).  The new bondholder receives abr  after taxes while the 
remaining equityholders lose only ar(1 -  T)  after both corporate and 
personal income taxes (when they pay the interest on the extra debt). 
Gordon and Malkiel(l980) show that for plausible values of a  and (Yb, the 
expression r((Yb -  a(1 -  T))  is positive, which implies that investors as a 
group can save on taxes by any and all increases in the firm’s debt-capital 
ratio. 
While replacing equity with debt is advantageous for tax reasons, a 
higher  debt-capital ratio also implies a higher probability  of  default. 
Modeling of  Corporate Financial Decisions 
4.  This version of  the capital asset pricing model allows for an arbitrary variation in tax 
rates across investors and across types of  return (e.g. interest  payments versus capital 
gains). The key assumptions underlying the model are: (1) investors care only about the 
mean and the variance in the return on their portfolio, (2) only returns taxed at capital gains 
rates are stochastic, (3) capital gains are taxed  at  accrual, (4) there are no short sales 
constraints, and (5)  the tax law allows for full loss offset. The latter assumption, as stated, is 
clearly false. A firm with tax losses has the ability, however, to carry losses backward and 
forward to other tax years, and it has the option to merge with a firm with taxable profits. 
Moreover, we are concerned with the marginal investment and not necessarily the marginal 
firm. Most of  these marginal investments will be undertaken by preexisting firms that are, on 
average, profitable. Any loss on such a marginal investment would only serve to reduce the 
taxable profits of  such a firm. We assume that, given these possibilities, full loss offset is a 
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Bankruptcy and the threat of  bankruptcy create real costs.’ The firm’s 
debt-capital ratio is in equilibrium when the increase in expected lever- 
age-related costs resulting from replacing a dollar of equity with a dollar 
of debt just offsets the tax savings from using a dollar of  debt instead of 
equity. Let y represent the firm’s debt-capital ratio, and let c(y) represent 
the increase in expected leverage-related costs borne by investors as a 
group from having an extra dollar of  debt when the initial debt-capi- 
tal  ratio  is  y.6  Then  in  equilibrium  y  is  chosen  such  that 
r(ab -  a(  1 -  T)) = c(y).  One would expect that c(0)  =  0 and dc/dy >  0. If 
there were no tax distortion favoring debt, this formula implies that the 
firm would use only equity finance and thus avoid all bankruptcy risk. 
Leverage-related costs include more than just direct litigation costs in 
bankruptcy. As Warner (1977) and Gordon and Malkiel (1980) show, 
litigation costs themselves are very small. When the firm faces the possi- 
bility of  bankruptcy, however, it also faces distorted investment incen- 
tives, as described in Myers (1977). When considering a risky investment, 
equityholders ignore the higher probability of losses to existing debthold- 
ers. Since equityholders receive any gains but pass large enough losses 
onto bondholders,  they  face distorted investment  decisions. Though 
debtholders would presumably charge for these costs ex ante, distorted 
investment incentives would remain and equityholders would bear the 
costs of this inefficiency.  In addition, labor costs can rise, since employees 
would be reluctant to remain in  a job with an uncertain  future. The 
function c(y)  is intended to capture all such leverage-related costs. 
Let D*  represent the amount of debt chosen to finance the capital stock 
K, and let y*  = D*/K.  Then, since c(y)  measures the marginal leverage 
costs of  using a dollar more  debt, Jf*c(D/K)dD  measures  the total 
leverage cost borne by the firm’s investors. If we assume that c(y) has the 
functional form  c(y) = aye, then  in  equilibrium  the  total  costs from 
having D*  of  debt would be 
This expression provides a measure of the privately borne costs resulting 
from the tax distortion favoring debt finance.’ 
However, any extra expenses arising from a higher debt-capital ratio, 
e.g. resources spent negotiating and monitoring an agreement, would be 
deductible from the corporate tax base. These net of  corporate tax costs 
5. If  there were no bankruptcy costs but merely a transfer of risk to bondholders, then 
the firm still would have the incentive to move to all debt finance, as shown in Modigliani 
and Miller (1963). 
6. The form of the function c(y), and so the optimal value of  y, will vary by  firm. 
7. To the extent that others are hurt but cannot charge the firm for their costs, even ex 
ante, this measure is an underestimate of  the private costs of leverage. 376  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
would then also reduce the individual’s personal fax base. Therefore the 
expression for private leverage costs c(y) represents only a(1 -  T)  per- 
cent of  the total (social) extra leverage-related costs resulting from re- 
placing a dollar of  equity with a dollar of debt. Total before-tax leverage- 
related costs can then be approximated by 
rD*(ab -  a(1 -  T)) 
a(1 -  T)(e + 1) 
In the simulations of  proposed tax  changes, we  will  calculate  the 
change in this estimate of  leverage-related costs. This change represents 
an efficiency  gain (or loss)  resulting from changing the tax distortion 
which presently favors debt finance. 
11.2.2 
a Corporate capital intensity decisions will depend on the cost of finance 
when the firm is using this optimal debt-capital ratio. We assume that the 
capital stock of  a corporation is in equilibrium when investors are willing 
to pay just a dollar for the returns from an additional dollar of  capital. 
Consider a type of  investment where the returns are nonstochastic. Then 
the investment would be pursued using debt finance (with the capital as 
security), since there would be no leverage-related costs offsetting the tax 
advantage of  debt. When the return to an investment is risky, however, 
the optimal percent of  debt, y:  used in financing it will be lower because 
the firm will trade off the tax advantages of  debt against the costs arising 
from the higher risk of default. If the return from new investment is just 
as risky  as the return from existing capital, we would expect that the 
appropriate y*  for the new capital would equal the existing y for the firm 
as a  whole.  We will  assume that these  conditions hold, so  that the 
marginal y equals the average y. 
To be willing to  finance a project, equity- and debtholders  must receive 
at least the risk-free return after taxes, plus enough to compensate them 
for the risk that they bear. Define 6,  as the total after-tax risk premium 
required by corporate equity- and debtholders together on the return 
from each dollar they invest in the project. By definition, 6,  includes any 
leverage-related  costs. Also, let  r,  be the before-tax risk-free interest 
rate, and let p,  be the project’s expected rate of  return gross of  both taxes 
and depreciation. Then, in equilibrium, the marginal investment ought to 
earn a p,  such that 
Modeling of  Capital Intensity Decisions 
(2)  a(1 -  ~)(p,  -  yr) + abyr = abrz + 6,. 
The first term on the left-hand side measures the return to equityholders 
after taxes, and the second term measures the after-tax return to debt- 
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The  right-hand side of this equation in effect measures the before-tax rate 
of  return to the investment required by the market. Note that, at the 
optimal debt-capital ratio, this expression is minimized.R 
This derivation ignores many complications, however. Suppose that, 
for each industry, d is the geometric rate of  economic depreciation of 
capital, and d, is the constant geometric rate of  depreciation  for tax 
purposes that implies the same discounted present value of  tax deduc- 
tions as the more complicated tax law. Suppose that k is the effective rate 
of  the investment tax credit, and 6  is the effective rate of state and local 
property tax (net of benefits) on the capital stock. Suppose also that IT  is 
the expected inflation rate. When all these additional factors are intro- 
duced, the equilibrium value of  pc will satisfy' 
(4)  +&c(l -k) 
Ci(1 -  T) 
pc = d + tp + (1 -  k)rz  ~ 
Ci(1 -  7) 
(Yb-a(Y(1 -7)  T(d-4)  IT 
Ci(1 -  7)  I+  1-T  (1 -T)' 
Here, pc is a real rate of  return, while r and r,  are nominal risky and 
risk-free interest rates, respectively. 
This formula is basically a generalization of the well-known formula for 
the cost of  capital in Hall and Jorgenson (1967). If uncertainty is ignored 
(so 6c = 0 and r = r,),  if  personal  and property taxes are ignored  (so 
a  = Cib = 1  and tp = o), if  inflation is ignored (so IT  =  O), and finally, if the 
possibility of  debt finance is ignored (so y =  O), the above formula sim- 
plifies to 
d + r(l -  k)  -  Td, 
Pc = 
1-T 
This formula now differs from that in Hall-Jorgenson only because the 
decision under consideration  here is to invest  a dollar now  and then 
maintain a dollar of  capital in place through later investments to offset 
depreciation. Hall-Jorgenson, in contrast, consider only whether to in- 
vest a dollar now.'" Each of the generalizations included here changes the 
degree to  which taxes affect the equilibrium marginal product of  capital. 
In some cases they change it greatly. 
8.  Differentiating the right-hand side with respect toy and equating to zero implies that 
r(ah -  a(l -  7))  = d8,idy.  This equation is just the equilibrium condition for an optimal 
debt-capital ratio derived above, where d8,ldy  corresponds to c(y). 
9. See Gordon (1980) for  a derivation. 
10. Hall-Jorgenson  also describe tax depreciation allowances in terms of  their present 
value Z  rather than the equivalent constant flow d,. 378  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
Now consider the capital stock of  a noncorporate firm in the same 
setting. It will be in equilibrium when the nominal return (after deprecia- 
tion and taxes) equals the after-tax return on a risk-free asset plus enough 
to compensate for the risk. Define 6,,  as the after-tax  risk  premium 
required by noncorporate proprietors in each industry on the return from 
each dollar they invest, and define m as the proprietor’s personal mar- 
ginal tax rate. Then, pnc will satisfy 
= r,(l -  m) + snc. 
Solving for pnc, we find 
(7) 
snc(1 -  k)  pnc = d + rp + (1 -  k)r,  + 
1-m 
m  7F  +-  (d -  dx) -  -. 
1-m  1-m 
In these equations, we have assumed that the proprietor finances the 
capital himself.  If  he obtains extra funds from another party with the 
same marginal tax rate, then the equation continues to hold, whether the 
proprietor borrows from the other individual or makes him a partner in 
the business. Since there is no tax advantage to debt finance here, debt 
will only be used when it creates no leverage-related costs. Also, since the 
proprietor’s personal assets, as well as the business’s assets, can be put up 
as collateral, debt can be kept riskless, and presumably free of leverage 
costs, much more easily here than in the corporate sector. 
We modified equation (6) slightly for the real estate industry, which 
includes both rental and owner-occupied housing. For owner-occupied 
housing, there is basically no personal income tax on the returns to the 
investment, though  r,,  continues to be  deductible, implying  that  in 
equilibrium 
1 
-  (pnc + T -  d -  fp(l -  m))  = r,(l -  m)  + S,lc. 
1-k  (8) 
The above analysis  of  noncorporate investment  is  also  not  quite 
appropriate for rental housing. We ignore any taxation of  inflationary 
capital gains in other noncorporate business on the presumption that the 
gains would be realized  sufficiently rarely,  except at death when they 
would be tax free. In rental housing, however, gains are realized much 
more frequently. If g equals the effective capital gains tax rate, then the 
equilibrium condition becomes 379  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
-  g.rr = y,(1 -  m)  + isn,. 
1-k 
To obtain pnc for the real estate industry as a whole, we took a weighted 
average of the equilibrium values for rental and owner-occupied housing. 
For weights, we used the sizes of  the capital stock in each sector.’’ 
In order to apply the above theory to the FSW general equilibrium 
model, several further assumptions must be made. Each industry will be 
characterized by its own values for d,  dx,  k,  and ti,,,,  the risk premium 
when there are no leverage costs. In effect, the inherent riskiness and 
durability of  capital assets used  by  each industry  will  be  taken to be 
exogenous. The corporate sector in each industry will also be character- 
ized by its observed values for y and 6,.  However, corporate financial 
policy  (7)  will be endogenous in the model, as will be the size of  the 
leverage cost component of 6,.  A later section derives expressions for the 
inherent risk  component of  6,,  which  will  remain  constant, and the 
leverage cost component of  6,, which varies with y. When tax changes are 
simulated, these parameters y and 6, will vary systematically from their 
observed values. 
The values for these industry-specific parameters, together with the 
market parameters r,, r,  T,  T,  a,  and ah,  determine a value of p,  for each 
industry. The same industry and market parameters are used along with a 
proprietor’s tax rate m to determine a value of  pnc in each industry. We 
then take a weighted average of p,  and p,,,,  using as weights the relative 
sizes of the corporate and noncorporate capital stocks in that industry. 
The percent of  capital in  each industry used  by  incorporated  firms is 
assumed to be exogenous.’* The resulting industry-wide value for the 
marginal product of capital we denote by p. 
Given the market interest rates rand r,, we have a separate value of p 
for each industry. Given the rest of the model, these values for p imply a 
desired capital stock for each industry. The sum over all industries of 
these desired capital stocks equal the total demand for capital. In each 
equilibrium simulation, the solution algorithm finds an r, such that this 
11, There are no explicit estimates for the proportion of  housing capital that is owner- 
occupied.  Using  numbers from  the Statistical  Abstract,  we  multiplied  the  number  of 
homeowners by the median value of  owner-occupied homes, and then divided by the value 
of  the total  housing  stock. These figures reveal  that, although approximately 65%  of 
households own their own homes, 85% of  the value of  housing stock is owner-occupied. 
12. Too little is known about the responsiveness to tax parameters of  the decision to 
incorporate to model this decision explicitly. 380  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
total demand for capital just equals the available supply of capital." The 
supply of  capital in each period  is fixed, but  the endogenous savings 
response of  one  period is used to appropriately  augment the capital stock 
for the next equilibrium in the sequence. This process is described in 
more detail below. 
11.2.3 
In  order to  use  the  above procedure to calculate  the equilibrium 
marginal product in each industry, many new data are needed. In this 
section, we describe how we calculate each of the needed variables. We 
calculate data values for 1973 in order to be comparable with the FSW 
model. 
Property  Tax Rates (t,) 
In  FSW, the property tax  is  modeled  as a distorting proportional 
income tax on capital. The benchmark  tax rate on any industry is set 
equal to the observed  property tax payments  relative  to net capital 
income in that industry. Since owner-occupied housing is included in the 
housing industry, this modeling applies to household as well as commer- 
cial and industrial payers of  property taxes. 
In the above derivation, the property  tax was modeled instead as a 
proportional tax on  the value of the capital stock. However, the appropri- 
ate value of  tp is not clear. The average tax rate can readily be calculated 
by taking the ratio of property tax payments to the value of the capital 
stock in each industry. However, local public expenditures financed by 
the  property  tax  provide  some  offsetting  benefits.  Tiebout  (1956), 
McGuire (1974), and Hamilton (1976) take both benefits and taxes into 
account and develop a set of assumptions under which the property tax on 
residential property is nondistorting. It is just a price at which households 
can purchase local public goods. The assumptions underlying this conclu- 
sion are strong. For example,  they rule out any spillover of  benefits across 
community lines. They also require a large number of communities, yet 
the population of each community must be sufficiently large that further 
expansion entails congestion costs which just offset the gains from sharing 
the costs of  public expenditures with more people. In this paper, how- 
ever, we will  accept the Tiebout hypothesis for households  as a first 
approximation. Specifically, we assume that the effective property tax 
rate in the housing industry is zero.14  However, we do  report briefly below 
13. We assume that the  bond  risk premium  r -  r,  equals a given preset  value in  all 
contexts. It would have been preferable to allow it to vary by  industry and across simula- 
tions. Lacking the information necessary to do this seriously, we did not attempt to do it at 
all. Fortunately, sensitivity analysis indicates that the value of  the risk premium r -  r,  has 
very little effect on the value of  a. 
14.  The application of  the Tiebout model to the property tax depends critically on the 
availability of zoning regulations (see Hamilton 1976).  The argument does not apply to state 
and local income (wage) taxes, where zoning is not available to enforce the creation of 
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on a simulation where half of  property taxes on housing are treated as 
distorting. 
Application of  the Tiebout hypothesis to commercial and industrial 
property seems less convincing.  A  defense  of  this  application is  de- 
veloped in Fischel(1975) and White (1975). The essence of  the argument 
is  that if  communities  compete to obtain  commercial  and industrial 
property, then the property tax payments and the benefits will, in equilib- 
rium, be set such that the community is indifferent to whether or not a 
new firm enters. As a result, a profit-maximizing firm will choose the most 
efficient location. Its tax payments may go not only to finance the benefits 
it receives but also to compensate the community for the noise, pollution, 
or congestion that it creates. In this setting it seems plausible to assume 
that the tax is nondistorting. 
However, once a firm has located and is considering additional invest- 
ment, it has lost its bargaining position with the community. To relocate, 
the firm would incur large fixed costs. The community may have some 
inhibition about exploiting captive firms. Some firms may indeed leave, 
and certainly new firms would as a result be more reluctant to enter. Yet 
in  this  context there is  certainly less  competitive pressure  to equate 
additional taxes with additional benefits. 
Because of the ambiguity of the theory, we ran two sets of simulations. 
In one simulation, all  property tax payments were  exactly  offset  by 
benefits. In the other simulation, half  of  nonresidential tax payments 
were assumed to  be offset by benefits while all of  residential tax payments 
were  assumed to be offset  by  benefits.  Together the two simulations 
provide  a  sensitivity  test  of  the importance  of  the treatment of  the 
property tax.  The effective  tax  rates  tp used  in  the second case  are 
reported in column 2 of  table 11.1. These parameters equal half of  the 
observed property tax divided by the capital stock in that industry. 
Corporate Debt-Capital Ratios (y) 
Gordon  and Malkiel(l980)  used data from the COMPUSTAT'5  tape to 
estimate the ratio of  the market value of  debt to the market value of debt 
plus equity. This calculation included firms with securities traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange, on the American Stock Exchange, and over 
the counter. Only economy-wide figures were reported in that paper. 
Here, we used the same procedure to calculate the ratio separately for 
each of our eighteen  private industries.I6  The resulting figures for 1973  are 
reported in column 3 of  table 11.1." 
communities with homogeneous income as well as homogeneous tastes for public services. 
We therefore continue to  treat state and local income taxes as distorting taxes. 
15.  COMPUSTAT is a data set compiled by Standard and Poor Corporation containing 
balance  sheet information on many publicly traded corporations. 
16.  Only the book value of debt is reported on the COMPUSTAT  tape. We used figures 
from von Furstenburg, Malkiel, and Watson  (1980) on  each industry's average ratio of 382  Don FullertodRoger H. Gordon 
Risk Premiums  (6, and 6,,) 
Consider a particular security s, with an expected after-tax return 3, 
where the overbar indicates expectations. The capital asset pricing model 
implies that the risk premium? -  a&  ought to equal pS(Tm  -a&), where 
r, is the expected after-tax return on the market portfolio, and p,  is the 
covariance of r, and r,,  divided by the variance of r,. The risk premium 
can be measured either directly, by using? -  abrz,  or it can be measured 
indirectly,  by  estimating  p,  for that security  and  multiplying  by  the 
expected risk premium on the market portfolio 
Here, in estimating a,,  we have chosen the indirect method to measure 
the risk premium on equity in each industry and the direct method to 
measure the risk premium on bonds. The risk premium 6, appropriate for 
a dollar invested in corporate capital in each industry is then the sum of 
the risk premium on y dollars of  debt and the risk premium on (1 -  y) 
dollars of equity. 
To calculate each industry’s risk premium on equity, we proceeded by 
first estimating the p for a value-weighted portfolio of  the equity from all 
firms in the industry which were traded publicly on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The estimation was done over the period 1969-73 using the 
Center for Research in  Securities Prices  monthly  returns data. The 
market portfolio was taken to be a value-weighted portfolio of  the equity 
from alf firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The risk pre- 
mium on the equity in each industry is then this estimate of  p times the 
expected excess return on the market portfolio, which Merton (1980) 
estimates to be 0.1075.’’ 
Lacking information about how the risk premium on bonds varied by 
industry, we assumed a common risk premium of ab(r -  rz),  which equals 
0.0246 using the parameter values discussed below. The value of  6,  was 
then set equal to 0.1075(1 -  y)p + 0.02467 in each industry. Implicitly we 
assume here that the potential new capital in an industry is equally as 
risky as the existing capital. The resulting values for 6, by industry are 
reported in column 4 of  table 11.1. 
The value of 6,,  ought to differ from that for 6, for two major reasons. 
First, given present tax law, investment will be riskier in the corporate 
sector where tax incentives favor debt. For noncorporate investment, no 
taxes are saved through debt rather than “equity” finance, so there is no 
market value to book value of debt to construct figures for the market value of debt for each 
firm on the tape. When the ratio of the market value of debt to the book value of  debt was 
not available for a specific industry, we applied the economy-wide ratio to the firms of that 
industry. 
17. The debt-value ratio, as calculated here, will differ shghtly from the debt-capital 
ratio used in the theory, however. In particular, a dollar raised in the market is sufficient to 
purchase 1/(1 -  k)  dollars of  capital yet is valued in the market at a dollar. Therefore the 
calculated debt-value ratio would equal y/(l -  k),  where y is the debt-capital ratio. 
18.  We used  the estimates from Merton’s model 3, estimated over the time period 
- 
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tax incentive to accept real leverage-related costs.’Y  Therefore the risk 
premium on a noncorporate investment ought to be smaller than that on 
an otherwise equivalent corporate investment since it ought to be free of 
leverage-related costs. 
To estimate the additional leverage cost arising from investment in one 
more dollar of corporate capital, assume that leverage costs are propor- 
tional to the size of the capital stock for any firm, holding y constant. The 
marginal leverage costs would then equal the expression for privately 
borne leverage costs derived earlier, divided by the size of  the capital 
stock, or 
yr(ab -  a(1 -  T)) 
e+l 
Without the tax distortion  favoring debt, the corporate risk premium 
would be smaller by this amount. 
A second reason for ti,,  to  differ from 6,  is that the government absorbs 
a different percent of  the risk from investment in each sector. The risk 
borne by  investors on a  dollar  investment  would  differ  between  the 
sectors, even if  the inherent2”  riskiness of  the investment were the same, 
because the tax rates differ. Because of  taxes, the risk borne by corporate 
investors is only a( 1 -  T)  percent of the total risk in the return to corpo- 
rate capital. Similarly, noncorporate investors bear only (1 -  m)  percent 
of  the total risk in the return on their capital. 
We assume that these are the only two reasons why 6,,  differs from 6,. 
In particular, we assume that noncorporate capital is just  as risky  as 
corporate capital, leverage costs aside, and that noncorporate investors 
charge the same risk premium per unit risk that they bear as do corporate 
investors.2’  We then conclude that 
In the simulations, we will assign to the investment in each industry a 
constant inherent risk premium  S equal to Snc/(l -  m).  (This measure 
corrects for the fact that only (1 -  m)  percent of  noncorporate risk is 
borne privately and does not include any leverage costs.) The risk pre- 
mium appropriate  for privately borne risk in the noncorporate sector will 
then be simply (1 -  m)S. Only if  the proprietor’s tax rate changes in a 
19. There may be other reasons besides taxes to prefer debt finance, however. 
20.  By “inherent risk,” we refer to risk associated with the capital asset, regardless of 
financing and regardless of  taxes. 
21.  Noncorporate investors may not have the same ability to spread risk, however, since 
their securities are not publicly traded, so they may require a larger risk premium. The tax 
system may discourage  incorporation where risk bearing is more efficient, but we ignore this 
tax distortion and assume that the risk premium required per unit risk is indeed the same. 384  Don FullertodRoger H. Gordon 
simulation would the noncorporate risk premium change. Similarly, the 
corporate risk premium for privately borne risk will be set equal to 
Thus, if  the tax incentive favoring debt is reduced, the leverage cost 
component of  6,  will decline. 
Investment Tax Credit Rates (k) 
After an April 1969 repeal, the investment tax credit (ITC) was rein- 
troduced in 1971. It allowed any corporate or noncorporate business to 
subtract  from its tax  bill  7% (4% for public  utilities)  of  its eligible 
investment expenditures, defined as equipment with at least a seven year 
useful life. One-third credit was allowed for assets with three to five year 
lives and two-thirds credit for five to seven year lives. The 7% statutory 
rate was increased to 10%  in 1975 and subsequently made permanent. 
The parameter k in above formulas, however, refers to an effective ITC 
rate on all investment (including inventories and plant as well as equip- 
ment). It ought to take into account all limitations, carry-forward, and 
carry-back provisions. Because the proportion of  investments which are 
eligible for the credit, or for different fractions of  the credit, will vary by 
industry, the effective ITC rate k will also vary by industry. 
In order to estimate this effective ITC rate in each industry, we looked 
at the dollar value of  credit taken in a particular  year relative to that 
year’s total investment. Because the credit taken in 1973 may not reflect 
the credit which eventually  accrued to 1973 investments, we took the 
average of  the effective rates in 1973 and 1974.” We thus tried to obtain a 
“steady state” rate which accounts for carry-forwards and carry-backs. 
The appendix provides details concerning how the data were obtained. 
The resulting figures for the effective ITC rates appear for each industry 
in table 11.1. column 5. 
Economic Depreciation Rates (d) 
The above formulas require eighteen annualized rates of  depreciation 
for the industries defined  in  this model.  Several other studiesz3  have 
estimated rates of  depreciation using various assumptions and various 
investment disaggregates, but  none is immediately applicable for our 
purposes.  Some studies, however, provide  dollar values of  economic 
depreciation for industry definitions similar to ours. Using time series on 
investment by industry, we can estimate geometric annual rates of  depre- 
ciation for use in this model. 
22. These are the two years for which the best data were available. The same 7% credit 
23.  See,  for example, Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) and Hulten and Wykoff (1980). 
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Looking at a particular industry, suppose that EDi is the dollar figure 
for economic depreciation in the i th year during the period 1972 to 1974. 
The  sources  for data on ED  are described in the appendix. We then tried 
to find that geometric depreciation rate on all prior investments in that 
industry which would be most consistent with the observed values EDi. 
Let Ifrepresent gross real investment undertaken in year  f, in  year i 
dollars. Then, if there were geometric depreciation at rate d, economic 
depreciation in year i would equal 
x 
ED:‘=  C d(l -  d)rIr-f. 
r=o 
Here, the superscript  “pr” indicates the predicted, in contrast to the 
actual, ED,. 
One problem, of course, is that investment data by industry were not 
available prior to 1947. The small effect of pre-1947 investment can be 
approximated by assuming that investment in all years before 1947 grew 
at the same rate p. We estimated  p to be 0.027 for all nonresidential 
investment  and 0.021 for residential  investment from  aggregate  data 
available over the period  1929 to 1947. If  these two categories of  real 
investments did grow at these rates before 1947 and if the same deprecia- 
tion rate  applied  in  all years  before  1947, then the depreciation  on 
pre-1947 investments in 1972 would be 
where 26 is the number of  years between 1946  and 1972. In general, then, 
we approximated ED?  by 
dIR  ,-d(I-1947+1)  i-1947 
ED,P’  =  1947  +  2 dIF-,(l  -d)‘. 
P+d  f =  0 
We then chose that value of d  for each industry which minimized the 
sum of  squared differences between  the observed  and predicted  EDi 
during the period 1972-74. The  appendix provides information about the 
sources  of the data and further details about the procedure. The eighteen 
resulting economic depreciation rates d are reported in table 11.1, col- 
umn 6. 
Tax Depreciation Rates (d,) 
Above formulas used d,  as the effective constant nominal depreciation 
allowance for tax purposes per dollar of  maintained  capital. We esti- 
mated this concept by starting  with the assumption that the tax law allows 
exponential depreciation at an annual rate d‘ based on historical cost. 
(Derivation of the value of d’ which best approximates  the actual tax code 
is described below.) 386  Don FullertonJRoger H. Gordon 
In the situation of  equation (4), we  consider an additional dollar of 
investment which is maintained in  nominal terms through subsequent 
replacement investment at the rate (d -  T).  Exponential depreciation for 
tax purposes at rate d' on this maintained investment will generally not 
result in a constant stream of  allowances. Though d'  may remain con- 
stant, the remaining basis for tax purposes does not. In particular, the 
basis in the first year is one dollar, while the basis in the second year is 
(1 -  d')  + (d -  T).  The second year basis will not equal one dollar if 
d + d' + -IT.  The inflation rate enters here since tax depreciation is based 
on historical cost. Since the basis is nonconstant, depreciation allowances 
of  d' times the bases are also nonconstant. 
As shown in Gordon (1980), the value of  d,,  which is constant over 
time and which implies the same present value of  deductions for corpora- 
tions as the nonconstant d' stream, would satisfy 
(d -  T)  + ~(1  -  T) 
d' + r,(l -  T) 
d, = d' 
(For noncorporate firms, the same expression applies, except that T is 
replaced by m.)  We therefore can solve for d, on the basis of  figures for d' 
and other data.24 
Analogous to the economic depreciation rates d,  the tax depreciation 
rates d'  are estimated from IRS depreciation data and time series on 
investment. Looking at a particular industry, suppose that TD, is the 
dollar figure for tax depreciation in the ith year between 1972 and 1976. 
We then solved for the geometric depreciation rate d' that best approxi- 
mates the observed tax depreciation allowances TD,, using a procedure 
similar to that used in solving for d.  If Z, measures the nominal investment 
in a given industry which occurred in year t,  then d' was chosen so as to 
minimize 
1976 
i = 1972  I:  (TD, -  TDP')2, 
where 
i-  1947 
t=O 
TD? =  C  di-tZi-,(l - 
Here, dJ  is a function of time since the relevant tax law changed several 
times  during the period. Also, p here refers to the growth  rate for 
nominal investment prior to 1947, estimated to be 0.057 for nonresiden- 
tial investment and 0.059 for residential investment. In the appendix, we 
24.  In the simulations, d' is kept constant while d, varies due to changes in G,  T,  or m. 387  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
describe how  It and d; were obtained. The eighteen resulting effective 
constant tax depreciation rates d, for 1973 appear in column 7 of  table 
11.1. 
Proprietors’ Marginal Tax Rates (m,  g) 
The parameter m represents the average personal marginal tax rate 
paid by proprietors in the noncorporate sector. In principle, this marginal 
tax  rate  should  vary  by  industry, but  we  found  no data capable  of 
providing such information. Instead, we used the NBER TAXSIM pro- 
grams to calculate economy-wide average marginal tax rates for business 
income, supplemental schedule income, partnership income, and small 
business corporation profits. We then set m  equal to 0.365, the weighted 
average of the average marginal tax rates for each category of income.25 
The parameter g represents the effective capital gains tax rate on rental 
housing.  By  1973 tax  law,  only half  of  capital  gains is  taxable.  We 
assumed in  addition that the postponement of  the tax payment  until 
realization  halves the effective tax  rate.  We  therefore  assumed that 
g = 0.25m = 0.091. 
Other Parameter Values (G, e, a,  ab, r, T,  r) 
There remain several economy-wide parameters that need to be esti- 
mated for 1973. For r,, the nominal before-tax risk-free interest rate, 
many economists have used the Treasury bill rate, which equaled 0.07 in 
1973. While Treasury bills are not risky in nominal terms, they are risky in 
real terms. Lacking any better estimate, we assumed the risk premium in 
the Treasury bill interest rate was 0.02, implying a risk-free interest rate 
of  0.05. As a sensitivity test, we also report results for a 0.07 risk-free 
rate. 
We estimated e using time series data for y and the market interest 
rate. According to the theory developed in section 11.1, the debt-capital 
ratio  will  be  in equilibrium  when  c(y) = aye = r(ab -  a(1 -  7)). This 
implies that 
e 
If  a,  e,  (Yb, a,  and T are all constant across time, e can be estimated by 
regressing log (y) on log (r)  and a constant term using time series data, 
and taking the inverse of the estimated coefficient of log (r).  Gordon and 
Malkiel(l980) provide yearly data on y for the period 1958-78. For r,  we 
25.  In calculating capital income in each category to use as weights, we followed the 
Treasury Department procedure of assuming that only 30% of business  income, partnership 
income, and small business corporation income is really return to capital, the rest being 
return to labor. We would like to thank Daniel Feenberg for performing these calculations 
for us. 388  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
used a yearly commercial paper rate. When we regressed log (y) on log 
(r),  we obtained 
log (y) = -2.44  + 0.557 log (r)  , 
(0.19)  (0.116) 
where  standard  errors  are  in  parentheses  under  the  coefficient 
estimates.26  We therefore used U0.557 = 1.79 as an estimate for e. 
Next, consider a  and ab, the personal tax parameters for equity and 
bonds. There is no need to estimate each parameter separately since it is 
only their ratio ab/a which matters in any of  the  computation^.^' 
Let us consider then the problem of  measuring the ratio ab/a.  The first 
problem faced is that the tax treatment of  the returns to equity depends 
on whether the returns take the form of  dividends or capital gains. It is 
not clear how  to proceed  since economists  do not  yet  have  a  good 
explanation  for why  dividends  are paid, given  their  unfavorable  tax 
treatment (see Black 1976). By repurchasing shares, a firm can create a 
dollar in capital gains in lieu of paying a dollar in dividends, and presum- 
ably would do so if  capital gains were valued more highly by the market. 
Since firms do pay dividends, we  assume that the market  does value 
dividends and capital gains equally. In fact, Gordon and Bradford (1980) 
estimate  the value in the market of  dividends versus capital gains and find 
that the market value of a dollar of dividends does not differ systemati- 
cally from the market value of  a dollar of  capital gains. That is, dividends 
must provide some other advantage which offsets their tax disadvantage. 
We therefore assume that the effective tax rate on equity is the capital 
gains tax rate. 
The ratio (Yb/(Y thus measures the value in the market of  a dollar of 
interest payments relative to a dollar in either dividends or capital gains. 
According to  the derivation in Gordon and Bradford (1980), this ratio is a 
weighted average of  the valuation each investor gives to interest relative 
to capital gains.**  The weights are proportional to the investor’s wealth 
and inversely proportional to a measure of his risk aversion. We there- 
26.  Of course, if any of the terms assumed to be constant had varied significantly over 
time, then the estimate of e could be biased. Probably the most important problem is that 
any increase  in the riskiness  in the economy during the  period would have caused the 
function c(y) to shift upward, raising the parameter a.  If this had occurred,  our estimate of e 
should be too high, implying that our estimate of  leverage costs may be too small. 
27.  The only place where a  appears alone is in the term S,/[a(l -  T].  However, S,,  while 
defined to be the after-tax risk premium, is estimated in this paper as in others by using 
before-personal-tax  data. The resulting estimate therefore equals &/a  directly, avoiding 
any need for a separate estimate of  a. 
28.  Some authors, e.g. Miller  (1977), have  constructed  models  with sharp clientele 
effects,  where a&  would equal the marginal tax rate of the marginal individual investing in 
bonds rather than stocks. All other individuals specialize in either bonds or stocks. How- 
ever, in a model with uncertainty and no short sales constraints, as in Gordon and Bradford 
(1980), all investors will hold some amount (positive or  negative) of  both types of  invest- 
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fore calculated an estimate for ab/a  directly from the twelve consumer 
groups of the FSW model by taking a weighted average of  their relative 
valuations of  interest and capital gains. In doing so, we made the follow- 
ing assumptions: (1) risk preferences do not vary across consumers, (2) 
the effective tax rate on capital gains is one-eighth of  the tax rate on 
intere~t,~~  and (3) only 70% of  an individual’s investments are taxable. 
According to 1973 Flow of  Funds data, approximately 30% of  savings 
were in pensions, IRA accounts, or other tax-free vehicles. The implied 
value of  abla  was 0.82. 
The remaining parameters r,  IT, and T  were directly observable. We set 
r = 0.08 and IT  = 0.05,3”  on the basis of the data for 1973 appearing in the 
Economic Report of  the President. We set T = 0.48, the statutory tax rate 
in 1973. 
11.3  Other Changes to the Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley Model 
11.3.1  Modeling of Government Enterprises and General Government 
The FSW model includes not only the eighteen private sectors de- 
scribed  above but two government sectors as well.  One, government 
enterprises,  includes government-run business activities, mainly the post 
office and TVA. This sector was modeled like the other private industries 
except that it received a large output subsidy from general government. 
The other sector, general government, captures the remaining activities 
of  government. We need to calculate equilibrium values for p for these 
two “industries”  comparable to those which characterize the other eigh- 
teen industries to help determine the demand for capital. Unfortunately, 
we do not have available the same quality of  information for these two 
sectors. 
We assume that government enterprises are cost-minimizing industries 
which meet all demand at the output prices dictated to them by higher 
levels of  government. We assume therefore that they invest until the real 
marginal product of  their capital is just high enough to cover deprecia- 
tion, the real risk-free  interest rate, and a suitable risk premium  SG. 
Formally, we assume that p = r, -  T + d + SG.3’  Lacking any indepen- 
dent information about d in this industry, we assume that it equals the 
weighted average of  the values in the eighteen private industries, where 
29.  Only one-half of  capital gains was taxable in 1973. In addition, the effective tax rate 
is approximately halved due to the postponement  of  tax payments until realization. We 
assume it is about halved again due to the markup of  the basis at death and due to the 
selective realization of  capital losses sooner than capital gains. 
30.  While  represents the expected inflation rate, we set it equal to the observed rate on 
the assumption of  myopic expectations. 
31.  This equation can be derived from equation (7) by setting 8,,J(l -  m)  equal to tiG, 
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the weights are the sizes of  the capital stock in each industry. To construct 
an estimate  for Sc,  we first calculate for each private industry the value of 
the risk premium on a dollar of  capital that would prevail if there were no 
leverage costs (as with noncorporate investments)  and if  all risk were 
borne by the private sector. This risk premium would equal S,,[(l  -  k)/ 
(1 -  m)].32  We then took the weighted average of these values over the 
eighteen private industries. 
General  government includes all remaining activities of  government. It 
receives revenue from the various taxes and from selling its endowment 
of  capital on the market. Part  of  the total  revenue is earmarked for 
lump-sum transfers to each consumer group. The benchmark transfers 
are based on data for welfare, government retirement, food stamps, and 
similar programs.33  As prices change in a simulation, government main- 
tains the same real payments in transfers to each group. 
General government also purchases each of  the nineteen  producer 
goods (eighteen private industry  outputs and government enterprises 
output), plus capital and labor. In doing so, it is assumed to maximize a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function whose arguments are these nineteen pro- 
ducer goods plus capital and labor. 
The question here is the appropriate measure for the cost of  capital to 
government. Since most of  the capital used in general government is used 
in state and local  government^,^^ we model capital intensity decisions in 
this sector as if  they were entirely local public decisions. 
The capital intensity of  a community’s public sector is in equilibrium 
when the (assumed) homogeneous residents in that community are in- 
different to adding an extra dollar of  capital. The community must also 
decide whether it is cheaper to finance its capital stock directly through 
property taxes or indirectly through the municipal bond market. The key 
tax factors in determining the equilibrium p here are: (1) property tax 
payments are deductible from taxable personal income if  the residents 
itemize, (2) the interest rate paid on debt is the municipal bond rate, and 
(3) there is no tax on the “profits” of  the sector. 
In calculating the equilibrium marginal product of capital in the local 
public sector,  let us assume that y percent of  an additional dollar of 
capital investment under consideration would be financed by debt. Let n 
equal the effective personal marginal tax rate at which residents deduct 
32.  The extra term  (I -  k)  enters because  8,J(l  -  rn) measures  the  risk  premium 
required for all the risk resulting from a dollar invested in a firm. But this investment buys 
l/(l -  k)  dollars of  new capital. 
33.  While the former (FSW) model includes social security and unemployment com- 
pensation payments as part of  the government’s lump-sum transfers, our model assumes 
these net out at the industry level. 
34.  According to the figures in Musgrave (1980), 72% of  the capital stock in this sector is 
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property taxes.35  Then the community must put up 1 -  y through taxes to 
finance the nondebt part of  the one dollar investment, at an after-tax cost 
Let p  represent the dollar value in each period  to residents in the 
community of  the marginal product of this dollar investment. Also, let rf 
be the nominal  (tax-free)  municipal  bond interest  rate at which  the 
community borrows.  Then, as a  result  of  this  investment, residents 
receive an implicit net nominal return equal  to  p -  yrf(1 -  n) -  (d -  .rr)rf/ 
r.36  Bondholders receive yrf before and after taxes. 
Together  the  community  and  the  bondholders  have  invested 
(1 -  n)(  1 -  y) + y dollars and must absorb together the risk in the return 
from the investment. Because of  this risk, they demand a suitable risk 
premium 6,  which we assume equals the risk premium for government 
enterprises. Bondholders would  require a  risk-free  return of  rfz,  the 
risk-free municipal bond rate, while members of  the community would 
require an after-tax  risk-free  return of  ahrz. Together they therefore 
would  require  a  return  on  their  investment  of  (1 -  n)(l -  y)abr, 
of  (1 -  n)(l -  y). 
+ Yrfz + ijG. 
(17) 
Therefore in equilibrium 
p -  yrf( 1 -  n) -  (d -  Tr)rf/r  + yrf 
= (1 -  n)(  1 -  y)a& + yrfz + 8G. 
We find solving for p that 
(18)  p = (d -  Tr)rf/r  + (1 -  n)a& 
-  y(( 1 -  n)a& + nrf -  rfi) + SG. 
The required value  for p is lower when  y  is  larger.  Therefore the 
community would use only debt finance unless marginal leverage costs 
are  sufficiently  large.  We  will  assume  that  y = 1,  implying  that 
p = (d -  n)rf/r + rfz -  nrf + 6,.  The equilibrium p here is lower than that 
for government enterprises because of  both the income tax deductibility 
of  property tax payments and the availability of  municipal bond interest 
rates. 
35. This rate n is equal to the personal marginal tax rate if (homogeneous) residents in 
the community itemize and is equal to  zero if they do  not itemize. In the calculations, we use 
a weighted average value for n,  as described below. 
36. This expression captures the annual flows to community residents when they make a 
municipal investment, maintained in nominal terms through the reinvestment of  (d -  71) 
each year. This subsequent capital loss and reinvestment is also assumed to be financed by 
issuing municipal  bonds, generating an after-tax interest expense in each future year of 
(d -  ~)r,(l  -  n).  We then need the present value of  these costs in the year the capital loss 
takes place.  Because  individuals  could  have  made  nonmunicipal  investments with  an 
after-tax return r(l -  n). their relevant discount  rate is r(l -  n).  The present value of 
the stream of  interest payments (d -  ~)rf(l  -  n), in the year of  the capital loss itself, is 
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Similarly, property taxes paid  to cover other local government  ex- 
penses are deductible from the federal  personal income tax. In particular, 
the after-tax  cost of hiring one  more dollar of labor services is only (1 -  n) 
dollars. We therefore include an n percent factor subsidy to labor in this 
industry. Current expenditures on any of  the nineteen commodities also 
cost (1 -  n)  percent of  the market ~rice.~’ 
In order to calculate values for p and the labor factor subsidy in this 
industry, we need values ford,  SG, 7,  qz,  and n. We set d and SG equal to 
the same weighted averages used for government enterprises. 
We also assumed that municipal bond interest rates are a given fraction 
O  of  the interest  rates on taxable  bonds, so that  yf=  Or  and 7z =  Or,. 
Gordon and Malkiel (1980) measure f3 to be 0.75. 
In calculating a value for n,  several steps were involved. First, accord- 
ing to the NBER TAXSIM file, the weighted average marginal tax rate in 
1975 for those who itemized and deducted property tax payments was 
0.260. In making this calculation, an individual’s tax rate was weighted by 
the size of  his property tax payments.3x  We assume that the same rate 
applied in 1973. However, not all property owners itemize. Using unpub- 
lished data from the National Income Division of  the Commerce Depart- 
ment along with the figures from the TAXSIM file, we infer that only 
44.8% of property taxes paid on residential property was in fact deducted 
from taxable income. This implies that the average marginal value of n 
equals (0.448)(0.260) = 0.117. 
This calculation, however, ignores the possibility that industrial and 
commercial property may pay part of the costs of  additional local public 
services. In fact, only  two-thirds of  property  tax  receipts come from 
residential property. When considering the effective property tax rate on 
business investment in earlier sections, we decided to explore the two 
alternative assumptions that (1) benefits completely offset taxes at the 
margin, and (2) firms (except in real estate) receive benefits which offset 
half of their property taxes. In the first scenario,  we set n = 0.117 because 
households are subsidized in their local public good “purchases” by the 
deductibility of their property taxes. Households receive no further sub- 
sidy or benefits from taxing businesses,  because  competitive pressure 
prevents communities from collecting any tax from firms without paying 
for commensurate benefits to them. 
In the second scenario, however, half of  industrial property taxes are 
left for services to residential property. (The other half of the revenues 
from business property are used to provide services to the firms.) Con- 
37.  One might argue, however, that these implicit subsidies to local public expenditures 
are  to  a degree Pigovian subsidies which  correct for  the  spillover of  benefits to other 
communities. To that degree, they are nondistorting. In this paper, however, we assume 
that these subsidies are distorting. 
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sider, for the moment, $1.20 of local property tax revenue. One-third, or 
$0.40, on average  would be paid by businesses. They would receive $0.20 
in benefits, which leaves exactly $1.00 for residential benefits. Residents 
then would  pay only $0.80 for a dollar of  benefits,  at a cost of  $0.80 
(1 -  0.117) = $0.707 after taxes. We therefore use (1 -  0.707) = 0.293 
for n when simulating the second scenario. 
11.3.2 
In the FSW model, net corporate earnings (NCE) after taxes and after 
depreciation were assumed to be proportional to the true capital stock 
(i.e. to equal rK, where r is the same for all industries). Therefore NCEIr 
provided a measure of  the capital stock in each indu~try.~’ 
According to the model in this paper, the size of  corporate earnings 
relative to the underlying capital stock will depend on many factors such 
as the risk premium, tax versus true depreciation rates, etc. However, 
expected gross corporate  earnings (GCE) before taxes and before depre- 
ciation ought to equal pcK. In section 11.2.2 pc was defined as the cost of 
capital gross of taxes and depreciation;  it varies by industry. We therefore 
used GCE/p, as a measure of  the corporate capital stock in each industry. 
Measurement of  Initial Capital Stocks 





corporate profits, from the Survey of  Current Business  (SCB)  cor- 
rected for the inventory valuation adjustment, 
corporate capital consumption allowances, from the SCB, 
corporate  interest payments, from unpublished data of the Commerce 
Department’s National Income Division (NID), and 
corporate rental payments.  Rents paid  by  industry were  available 
from NID, and we divided these into corporate and noncorporate 
payments in  the same proportions that the sums of  other earnings 
were divided in each industry. 
The same procedure will not work for the noncorporate sector since 
earnings  there are also in part labor income of the proprietors. Instead we 
assumed that within  any industry capital consumption allowances are 
proportional to the capital stock. We then multiplied our estimate of  the 
corporate capital stock in each industry by the ratio of  noncorporate to 
corporate capital consumption allowances in that industry to  produce an 
estimate of  the noncorporate capital stock. This logic helps provide 
estimates of  initial (1973) labor income in the noncorporate sector. If 
K,,p,,  is equal to before-tax earnings of capital and GPE is gross pro- 
prietor’s  earnings, then GPE -  K,,p,,  equals imputed  labor income. 
Here, GPE  is defined to equal the sum of  noncorporate profits (from the 
SCB), noncorporate capital consumption  allowances (from NID), in- 
39.  Interest payments and rental payments are included in NCE so as to capture the 
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terest paid  (from NID), and rents paid. Noncorporate rents were im- 
puted by the above procedure. If this residual for labor in 1973  turned out 
to be negative, we assumed there was measurement error and used zero 
for the initial noncorporate labor in that industry. 
For the two government sectors, we used estimates from Musgrave 
(1980) for the size of  the 1973 capital stocks. 
11.3.3  Measurement of  Capital Income before and after Taxes 
The FSW model defined total capital income net of  tax and deprecia- 
tion to equal the sum of corporate profits, capital consumption adjust- 
ment, net interest  paid, net rents paid, and  noncorporate returns to 
capital. In the new model, we set total capital income equal to K(p -  d). 
The major differences from the old procedure are: (1) depreciation is 
measured by the calculated dK rather than by reported capital consump- 
tion allowances with capital consumption adjustment, and (2) noncorpo- 
rate capital income is in effect measured by K,,(pnc -  d)  rather than by 
the reported data for noncorporate capital income.'" 
Let tk equal the average capital tax rate. We initially set tk equal to the 
ratio  of  observed  1973  capital  taxes  to  before-tax  capital  income 
K(p -  d).  In simulations, net capital income then equals  K(p -  d)(l -  tk) 
and capital tax revenue equals K(p -  d)tk. Calculation of the benchmark 
equilibrium replicates observed capital taxes in 1973, while appropriate 
changes in tk (together with changes in 7,  k,  d: etc.) allow simulation of 
counterfactual equilibria. 
11.3.4  Savings Incentives 
While the procedure described above provides estimates for the capital 
stock in the initial equilibrium, the capital stock in the next period will 
equal this initial capital stock plus net savings undertaken during the 
initial period by the twelve separate consumer groups. The capital stock 
in later periods will follow in a similar fashion. While we devoted much 
effort in this paper to improving the modeling of  investment decisions (by 
taking account of uncertainty and the optimal form of finance), we made 
few changes to the assumptions about individual savings decisions found 
in  the earlier model. 
In the FSW model, individuals in each consumer groupj  = 1,12  choose 
to  save some income to finance future consumption C,. They allocate the 
rest to a subutility function H which is defined over fifteen consumption 
goods Xi  and leisure 1. The fifteen Xi  consumption goods enter a Cobb- 
40.  Data are available only for total  noncorporate  income  I  and for the number of 
noncorporate workers L. FSW set the noncorporate wage rate w equal to the observed 
average wage rate from the corporate part of that industry, then set initial (1973) noncorpo- 
rate capital income equal to  I -  wL.  In this paper, we instead calculate a net rate of return to 
capital pnr -  d,  then set initial noncorporate labor income equal to I -  K,,(pn, -  d). 395  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
Douglas function with preference parameters hi  as exponents. Specifi- 
cally, each of  the twelve consumer groups will be characterized  by a 
nested CES utility function 
As in the FSW model, we use 0.15 for the uncompensated labor supply 
elasticity of each group  with respect to its net of tax wage. This parameter 
is used to set the elasticity of  substitution for the inner nest, between 
consumption goods and leisure. Unlike the FSW model, however, we 
cannot use a savings elasticity with respect to the real after-tax interest 
rate. In our model, this rate will normally be negative. Instead, we use 
12.3 as the uncompensated savings elasticity with respect to  one plus the 
real after-tax interest rate. This parameter is used to set the elasticity of 
substitution for the outer nest, between present and future consumption. 
The 12.3 figure was derived from Boskin's  (1978) equation (2). Boskin 
estimated that log C = A -  1.07R,  where C is consumption, R is the real 
net of  tax interest rate, and A represents other variables in his equation. 
But therefore log C-A -  1.07  log (1 + R).  It then follows that 
c 
= 1.07-.  l+R  aS 
S  d(l + R)  S 
In 1973, the ratio of total consumption to net savings was 11.5, from the 
Economic Report of  the President. We then used (1.07)( 11.5) = 12.3 for 
the elasticity of  S with respect to 1 + R in all periods for all consumer 
groups. In spite of  many objections  to Boskin's estimation procedure, we 
felt there was no good alternative. Saving is then converted immediately 
into investment demand for producer goods. 
A remaining issue is the determination of  the net of  tax real market 
interest rate faced by each group. As in the FSW model, we assume that 
individuals put a fixed fraction of  their (marginal) savings into pensions, 
Keogh  and IRA accounts,  and life  insurance.  We assume that such 
savings earn the market rate of return free of taxes. On the basis of  Flow 
of  Funds data for 1973, we set this fraction equal to 0.3. The remaining 
70% of their savings is then invested either in taxable bonds or  in tax-free 
municipal  bonds.  The return on taxable bonds is taxed at a constant 
personal tax rate mi  which ranges from 0.01 to 0.40 across the twelve 
consumer groups. Each individual can therefore earn a real net of tax 
risk-free''  rate  of  return  on  his  savings  equal  to  0.3rz + 0.7 
max(rf,,(l -  mj)rz)  -  T,  In  this  expression  tjz  represents the risk-free 
41.  We  assume  that  savers respond  to the  real  net  of  tax  risk-free rate  of return. 
Although they can obtain a higher real after-tax return by accepting risk, this premium is not 
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municipal bond rate. In the initial simulations, we set rjz = 0.75rz, on the 
basis of  the results in Gordon and Malkiel (1980). 
11.3.5  The Benchmark Equilibrium 
The FSW model, as used here, consists of  eighteen producer indus- 
tries, fifteen consumer goods,  twelve consumer  groups, plus the two 
government sectors. Before the model can be simulated, production and 
utility  functions  and their parameters must  be specified. The overall 
strategy  is  to choose remaining  parameters such that the model  will 
calculate an equilibrium that exactly replicates the consistent benchmark 
data set. 
Each industry in the FSW model is characterized by either a constant 
elasticity of  substitution or a Cobb-Douglas production function. Sub- 
stitution elasticities are chosen from the best estimates in the available 
literature. The size of  each industry's capital stock is calculated as de- 
scribed in section 11.3.2. The size of the benchmark demand for labor in 
the corporate sector is measured by the size of the labor payments in that 
industry in 1973, as reported in the SCB. The demand for labor in the 
noncorporate sector is measured as gross income of  the industry minus 
our estimate for the gross return to capital, p,,K,,. 
As in the FSW model, the parameters in the production function were 
then selected such that the optimal capital-labor ratio would equal the 
ratio which was in fact chosen, and such that the output produced using 
these factors would equal the observed  1973 output. In doing so, the 
rental cost of capital was set equal to  the calculated equilibrium rate p -  d 
for that industry. The cost of  a standardized unit of  labor was set equal to 
one plus the effective unemployment compensation tax rate reported in 
column 1 of table 11.1. Various federal excise taxes and indirect business 
taxes were modeled as output taxes for each of  the eighteen industries. 
As in equation (19) above, each consumer group has a nested utility 
function over future consumption, leisure, and fifteen commodities. The 
innermost nest is a Cobb-Douglas utility function over the fifteen con- 
sumer goods. The hi  coefficients were chosen so as to replicate observed 
relative expenditures on these commodities. In doing so, expenditures 
were measured gross of state and local sales taxes. In the next nest, there 
is a CES function by which the consumer chooses between these com- 
modities  and leisure.  Weights were  chosen such that individuals will 
choose to work forty hours out of  a potential seventy hours at their net of 
tax wage  rate. In the outer nest  of  equation (19), individuals choose 
between current and future consumption. 
Similarly, general government has a Cobb-Douglas  utility  function 
over the nineteen producer goods plus capital and labor.J' The param- 
42.  We use this aggregate function to capture the utility created by government expendi- 
tures, rather than having government expenditures enter directly into production functions 397  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
eters in this function were selected such that optimal demands  for goods, 
given market prices, would equal actual demands in 1973. 
Finally, the foreign sector is modeled by the assumption that the net 
value of  exports less imports for each producer good is constant. This 
simple treatment closes the model, maintains zero trade balance, and 
allows easy calculation of  trade quantities given prices." 
Because the data set for this model comes from many different sources, 
the figures are often inconsistent. For example, Treasury data on various 
forms of  capital income of  consumers differs from Commerce Depart- 
ment data on  industry payments for capital. In such cases, the data on  one 
side of the account were judged to be of  superior quality and the other 
data were adjusted to match. All reported industry and government uses 
of  factors were accepted, so consumers' factor incomes and expenditures 
were scaled to match. Reported tax receipts and transfers were accepted, 
so  government  expenditures  were scaled to balance  the budget.  The 
nearly balanced actual budget of  1973 luckily makes this treatment more 
reasonable. Similar adjustments ensure that supply equals demand for all 
goods and factors. 
The above assumptions guarantee that the model simulation in the 
initial period will replicate the 1973 figures. The dynamic model is de- 
rived assuming that the 1973  benchmark equilibrium lies on a steady state 
growth path. Observed saving behavior and the capital endowment are 
translated into an annual growth rate for capital, and this growth rate is 
also  attributed to effective  labor  units.  The benchmark  sequence of 
equilibria is then calculated by maintaining all tax rates and preferences 
fixed,  increasing  labor exogenously,  and allowing  saving to augment 
capital endowments  over time.* By construction, this sequence will have 
constant factor ratios and constant prices. In simulations of  revised tax 
policies, labor growth is exogenous while capital growth depends on the 
savings response to new tax rates and interest rates. 
11.4  Model Simulations 
11.4.1  Simulation Procedure 
A variant of  Scarf's (1973) algorithm is used to solve for each equilib- 
rium. A new dynamic sequence of the economy results from a change in 
or  each consumer  group's utility function.  Because  we  always hold government  utility 
constant in the simulations described below, this treatment will not affect our estimates of 
changes in consumer welfare attributable to tax policy changes. 
43. Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (chapter 10 of the present volume) suggest that the 
results may be sensitive to this assumption. 
44.  We  assume that  the relative wealth  of the twelve consumer groups remains un- 
changed over time. While the groups save different proportions of income, the unmodeled 
movement of individuals across our twelve groups over time ought to maintain the initial 
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initial conditions, such as a change in the tax law. In each equilibrium 
period of the sequence, demand will equal supply for all producer goods 
and factors, and each industry will have zero profits. Both capital and 
labor are assumed to be homogeneous and freely mobile across indus- 
tries.  In addition, as described below, we adjust personal income tax 
rates so as to produce a government revenue at each date which provides 
the same utility to government  given the new market prices as it had in the 
same period  of  the benchmark  equilibrium sequence. We make this 
assumption so that in the simulations we can focus on the changes in 
utility that individuals derive from private activities, holding constant the 
utility that individuals implicitly derive from public activities. 
Simplex dimensions are required only for w,  r,, and the additive surtax 
rate on  the personal income tax. Knowledge of these values is sufficient to 
evaluate the behavior of all agents. Producer-good prices are based on 
factor prices and zero profits, while consumer-good prices are based on 
producer-good  prices. 
A complete set of  prices, quantities, incomes, and allocations is calcu- 
lated for every equilibrium. A revised tax equilibrium can be compared 
to the benchmark equilibrium to provide a direct examination of  the 
effects of  the proposed tax changes. 
In describing the effects of any proposed tax change, we also calculate 
the equivalent variation  in each period. This is the lump-sum  dollar 
amount that would have to  be transferred  to  individuals in the benchmark 
equilibrium so as to give each consumer group the utility that they would 
have in the revised tax equilibrium. One complication in calculating this 
equivalent variation is that tax changes cause a change in the amount of 
risk and leverage costs, yet these costs do not appear explicitly in the 
model:“ our individual utility functions implicitly include the utility pro- 
vided from spending the risk premiums but do  not explicitly subtract for 
the disutility of  bearing risk. 
However, by assumption,  the risk premiums 6, or  6,,  measure the cost 
to the individuals  of  bearing  what  risk  is left  after taxes from  their 
investments. In addition, the government bears risk since its tax revenue 
is uncertain, yet costs of  risk bearing do not appear in the government 
utility function either. We assume in this paper that individuals ultimately 
bear this risk in proportion to  their wealth and find it just as costly to bear 
as risk they receive directly.46  In each simulation, we then measure the 
45.  Corporations take account of  leverage costs when making investment decisions at 
the margin, but these costs are never actually subtracted from firms’ profits. 
46.  Diamond (1967) provides a formal argument for this assumption. Also, we assume 
that individuals view the risk they bear indirectly as a lump-sum tax, even though we apply 
this “tax” in proportion to their (initial) wealth. We could have distributed the lump-sum 
tax in proportion to (initial) income, but the results would be very similar. The difference 
between these two procedures is only a lump-sum redistribution, which has general equilib- 
rium effects only to the degree that individual preferences for commodities differ. 399  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
time pattern of  consumption that each consumer group would have had, 
everything else equal, if  it did not receive the risk premium appropriate 
for all the risk in the return on its capital (including that borne by the 
government) but  also bore no risk.  Since we have then standardized 
utility at the point where there is no risk, we can directly compare utilities 
across simulations. The reported values for the equivalent variation refer 
to this standardized measure for ~tility.~’ 
11.4.2  Tax Distortions on Capital in the Initial Equilibrium 
In our initial simulations with the model, we left all tax rates at their 
observed values in 1973, thereby replicating the historical equilibrium. 
The results from this simulation provide us with a benchmark from which 
we can examine the welfare effects of several proposed tax changes. 
The key element that characterizes each of  the simulations that we 
undertake is  the function  relating  the market interest  rate r,  to the 
equilibrium marginal product of capital p in each industry. The formula 
used in calculating p in the initial equilibrium was derived in section 11.2. 
The equilibrium  p is a weighted  average of  the values of  pc and pnc 
characterizing corporate and noncorporate investment. 
In the first three columns of  table 11.2, we report the equilibrium 
values by industry for 
-  k)  S,  =pc  +~-d- 
CX(1  -  ‘T)  ’ 
and their weighted average by industry, defined as s. Here, we assume 
that the property tax is nondistorting. Each of these figures represents  the 
nominal return required by investors in that industry before any taxes but 
after depreciation. These returns are measured net of compensation for 
the riskiness in the return and net of  any leverage costs. As such,  they also 
represent the nominal social marginal product of the investment, net of 
the social costs from depreciation, risk, and leverage costs.‘* 
Were there no corporation tax, the risk-free nominal return on corpo- 
rate capital s,  ought to equal the risk-free nominal market interest rate 
47. The FSW model calculated the discounted sum of  this stream of  equivalent varia- 
tions to obtain a present value of welfare gains. The proper discount rate, however, is the 
real after-tax interest rate, which in our model is negative. The present value of any stream 
of  gains or losses would then be infinite. Instead, we report the stream directly. 
48.  We assume that risk  borne by  the government has the same social cost  as risk 
remaining in the private sector, as would be implied by  efficient risk spreading. The risk 
terms in equation (20) then do indeed correct for the social costs of  the risk created by the 
marginal investment. We also assume that the measure of  leverage costs included in 6, 
captures  the social costs of  leverage. If the government bears risk more cheaply, then there 
is a social benefit from taxes on capital income because of the resulting redistribution of  risk. Table 11.2  Nominal Risk-free Returns to Capital Net of  Depreciation 
With 
No Property Tax  Property Tax 
Base  Revise  Base  Revise  -~ 
sc  snc  S  sc  sc  sc 
All Industries* 
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
(2)  Mining 
(3) Crude petroleum  and gas 
(4) Construction 
(5) Food and tobacco 
(6)  Textile, apparel, and leather 
(7)  Paper and printing 
(8) Petroleum refining 
(9)  Chemicals and rubber 
(10)  Lumber, furniture, stone, clay, and glass 
(11)  Metals and machinery 
(12) Transportation equipment 
(13) Motor vehicles 
(14) Transportation,  communication, and utilities 
(15) Trade 
(16) Finance and insurance 
(17) Real estate 
(18) Services 
(19) Government enterprisest 






















,032  .034  ,040  ,044  ,048 
,033  .035  ,041  ,069  .061 
.034  ,041  ,041  .055  .051 
.026  ,035  .039  ,057  ,060 
.034  ,047  .041  ,062  ,049 
,031  .042  ,039  ,050  .047 
,040  ,046  ,045  .061  ,060 
,039  ,051  ,043  .061  .053 
.025  ,035  .037  ,037  ,039 
.036  ,051  .042  ,057  ,048 
,031  ,040  ,038  ,048  .045 
,033  .048  ,040  ,058  .049 
.033  .036  .040  ,086  .089 
.030  .040  .038  ,043  .041 
,033  ,033  .041  ,043  .051 
,034  .040  .041  .054  .053 
.032  .028  .040  .033  .044 
,032  .030  .039  .010  ,039 
,034  .033  .042  .046  .055 
,050  .050  .050  ,050  .050 
.037  ,037  ,037  .026  ,026 
*Averages  are calculated over eighteen private industries. All s,  use benchmark corporate capital as weights. The  S,,~ column uses benchmark noncorporate 
capital as weights, and s uses benchmark total capital as weights. 
'Government  sectors are neither corporate nor noncorporate. We show their s values for purposes of  comparison. 401  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
r,  = 0.05. This equivalence would hold even if  there were a (comprehen- 
sive) personal income tax on  the nominal return from all forms of saving. 
Had we just used the simplified modeling of  the corporate tax as a flat tax 
rate on the nominal return to  corporate capital, as did Harberger (1962), 
then s,  would equal rz/(l -  T) or 0.096 with our parameters. In sharp 
contrast, the equilibrium values of  s,  reported in table 11.2 are not only 
well  below  0.096  but  also mostly  below  0.05.  In fact, the weighted 
average value of  s,  over all industries is only 0.036. Using the formula for 
p,  in equation (4), we can reexpress s,  (without the property tax) as 
y + (1 -  k -  y)- 
--  T'T  +T(d-  dx) 
I-T  1--7 
The following factors,  identifiable in this formula, account for the surpris- 
ingly low value for s,. 
1. Equityholders require an after-corporate-tax return of only ab&/a, 
not r,, since the personal income tax on the alternative risk-free asset 
earning r,  exceeds the personal tax rate on corporate equity. This lowers 
s,  from rz/(l -  T)  to abr,/[a(l -  T)],  which equals 0.079. 
2. The use of  debt finance has multiple effects. First, the required 
nominal risk-free rate of return on debt before corporate taxes is only 
r, = 0.05. Since on  average  40% of capital is financed by debt,  s,  is thereby 
lowered to (0.079)(0.6) + (0.05)(0.4) = 0.067."' Second, ab  percent of 
the risk premium on bonds is received by bondholders after tax, while 
only a(1 -  T)  percent of  the risk remains on the investment after taxes. 
This exchange is favorable to investors, lowering s, by another 0.007. 
3. The inflationary capital gains component of the nominal returns, is 
not subject to  the corporate  tax. This lowers the equilibrium value of s, by 
T'T/(~  -  T)  = 0.055. 
4.  Partially offsetting this,  the effective  tax depreciation  rate d,  is 
below the economic depreciation rate d due to depreciation at historical 
cost in the tax law. This raises s,  on average by 0.033. 
5. Finally,  the  availability  of  the investment  tax credit  lowers  the 
equilibrium s,  by 0.002. 
The equilibrium values of the noncorporate  s,,  are also normally below 
r,  because  of  the above explanations  3  and 5, more than offsetting 
49. Also, leverage costs per unit capital are raised to 0.007, as implied by equation (ll), 
though this does not show up in equation (21) since s,  is net of  leverage costs. 402  Don FullertonIRoger H. Gordon 
explanation 4. The nominal  equilibrium  return to all capital s  is  on 
average only 0.034 (in column 3 of table 11.2). 
The equilibrium marginal time preference rate of  individuals will also 
be well  below  r, because  of  the personal  income tax.  The weighted 
average marginal time preference rate5"  for our twelve consumer groups 
turns out to be 0.043. Therefore, while individuals require a return of 
0.043 on their savings, the resulting investment produces a net return of 
only  0.034.  An  implicit  government  subsidy of  0.009 makes up the 
difference.  Tax  distortions  therefore  result  in  an  inefficiently  large 
amount of savings and investment. (When we assume that the property 
tax is half distorting in industries other than real estate, there will still be a 
small net subsidy to savings and investment.) 
If this distortion is negative, though small, why is so much tax revenue 
collected on the return to capital from both the corporate and personal 
income taxes? The explanation for this apparent puzzle is that most (in 
fact more than all according to our figures) of the taxable expected return 
is the risk premium. Yet while a significant percent of  the risk premium is 
taxed away, the same percent of the risk (standard deviation) is absorbed 
by the government through risky tax revenues. According to the capital 
asset pricing model, investors demand a risk premium proportional to the 
amount of  risk that they bear. Investors are therefore indifferent when 
they lose to the government a given percent of both the risk premium and 
the risk, so their behavior is undistorted. The government is just charging 
the market price for the risk that it absorbs. Since the risk premium is 
positive, however, expected tax revenues will be positive. 
Even if  the saving-investment distortion is small, however, other tax 
distortions remain. First, the variation of  the numbers in column 3 of 
table 11.2 implies an intersectoral misallocation of  capital across indus- 
tries, as emphasized in Harberger (1962). In addition, saving is misalio- 
cated across individuals  because of  the variation  in  after-tax rates of 
return  across  investors.  (Efficiency  requires  the same marginal time 
preference rate for each investor, and thus the same available after-tax 
rate of  return). Also, as always,  labor supply decisions are distorted 
because  of  the personal  tax.  Finally,  in  our initial simulation,  yearly 
leverage-related costs are estimated to equal 0.7% of the value of the 
corporate capital stock, or 0.6% of  GNP. This is hardly an insignificant 
figure. 
11.4.3  Modeling of  the Proposed Tax Revision 
The model in this paper is used to evaluate the general equilibrium 
effects of integrating corporate and personal taxes. Detailed descriptions 
50.  The marginal time preference rate for consumer group j  was assumed to equal 
(0.3rz + 0.7 max(rf,,(l -  mj)rz)),  the risk-free after-tax return to savings. Thirty percent of 
(marginal or average) savings are assumed here to be untaxed. 403  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
of  such proposals can be found in McLure (1975, 1979). Under the full 
integration proposal, as modeled in Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whal- 
ley (1980, 1981), the corporate tax would be eliminated. Instead, corpo- 
rate earnings would be included in the personal income tax base of  each 
of the shareholders in proportion to their holdings and would be taxed at 
ordinary personal income tax  rate^.^' 
Several changes must be made in the model to capture the effects of 
this tax change. First, equation (4)  relating pc  and r, changes substantially. 
Corporate profits would now be taxed at each investor's ordinary tax 
rate, regardless of corporate financial decisions. Since the tax distortion 
favoring debt finance is thereby eliminated, y goes to zero. There is now 
no offsetting advantage to counterbalance the leverage costs arising from 
debt finance. As a result, leverage-related costs go to zero as well. 
After integration, the corporation would be treated for tax purposes as 
if it were a partnership. The only reason why p,  now differs from pnc is that 
the average marginal tax rates of  corporate and noncorporate investors 
differ.52  We previously estimated that the marginal tax rate of noncorpo- 
rate investors equaled 0.365. Let m, equal the average marginal tax rate 
of  corporate investors after integration. We set 
12 
j=  1 
m, = 0.7 C  ymj, 
which equals 0.1948. Here, the mi  are the marginal tax rates of the twelve 
consumer groups and the vy are the proportions of  consumer wealth held 
by each group.53  We continue to assume that only 70% of capital income 
is taxable. 
The s,  after corporate tax integration can therefore be obtained from 
the  s,,  formula in  equation  (20),  with m = 0.365 replaced  by  m,  = 
0.1948." The resulting figures, reported in column 4 of  table 11.2, are 
calculated under the assumption that r, remains unchanged at 0.05, to 
ensure comparability with the other figures in table 11.2. (In the simula- 
tions, as r,  changes, all the s will change in  response.) Note that tax 
integration will not affect the equilibrium value of s,,,  holding r, constant. 
51.  The major purpose of  this paper is to investigate, for integration of  corporate and 
personal taxes, the sensitivity of  estimates to different model specifications. Rather than 
look at several types of  integration  (including partial plans or dividend relief) under one 
model specification, we find it more useful to look at one type of  integration under several 
model specifications. For more discussion of partial integration plans, see McLure (1979) or 
Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981). 
52. These  marginal  tax  rates  differ  if  individuals  who  choose  to form  their  own 
businesses differ systematically from those who invest in financial securities. 
53. This formula form, follows from the derivation of the Gordon and Bradford (1980) 
model on the assumption that individuals are equally risk averse at the margin. 
54. An equivalent procedure, actually used in our calculations, uses equation (4) for pc, 
sets T to 0.1948, and sets ab  to 1. -  0.1948 = 0.8052. Together, these changes imply that 
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We find that the new values for  s,  exceed the (new and old) values for  sn,. 
Investing in real capital is advantageous  during inflation since inflationary 
capital gains escape full taxation. This advantage is greater in the non- 
corporate  sector, where the marginal tax rate is greater. (Use of historical 
cost depreciation is more of  a disadvantage when marginal tax rates are 
greater, but this effect is not as important.) 
The relation between the values for s,  before and after integration is 
more complicated.  The advantage to investing in  real capital, where 
inflationary capital gains escape full taxation, declines with integration 
since the ordinary marginal tax rate on the return to capital declines. 
Offsetting this, however, the required before-tax risk-free nominal re- 
turn on equity-financed capital was (abrz)/[a(l -  T)] before integration, 
while the required return declines to r, after integration,  regardless of the 
form of  finance. 
When we assume that property taxes are half distorting in all industries 
except housing, the equilibrium values for sc,  s,,,  and s, with or without 
integration, all go up by the values for tp reported in column 2 of table 
11.1. In columns 5 and 6 of  table 11.2 we report explicitly the resulting 
values for s,  before and after corporate tax integration. 
In addition to recalculating the values for s,  we need to calculate how 
government revenues change each period  as a result of  corporate tax 
integration. Clearly, corporate tax revenues go to zero. However, corpo- 
rate earnings, whether retained or paid out as dividends, become fully 
taxable under the personal income tax.55  The new average tax rate on 
capital income t; is set equal to the ratio of these revised capital taxes to 
the capital income K(p -  d)  in the benchmark equilibrium. These new 
taxes include only property tax payments (when relevant) and personal 
income tax payments as they would be with no corporate tax but with full 
personal taxation of all corporate earnings. (These personal income tax 
payments will be referred to as the personal factor tax.) Tax revenue from 
taxation of  capital income  in  the revised  equilibrium will  then equal 
ti K'(p' -  d),  where primes denote the values in the revised equilibrium. 
We simulated corporate tax integration under several sets of  assump- 
tions in order to  test the sensitivity of the results to  the different specifica- 
tions. Table 11.3 summarizes the parameter values assumed in each of 
the simulations. The basic simulation, summarized as case 1  in the table, 
55.  For income effects of taxation in this model, we use features from the FSW model. In 
the benchmark  equilibrium, only 96% of  dividends are taxable, to account for the $100 
dividend exclusion in 1973. Retained earnings were assumed to generate equivalent accrued 
capital gains, but these are taxed on a deferred basis at preferential rates. Accounting for 
taxation of  purely nominal capital gains, however,  FSW use 73% as the proportion  of 
retained  earnings subject to full personal rates. Integration  changes both of  these latter 
proportions to one. Also in the benchmark, individuals reduce their personal tax base by 
30% of savings, the amount contributed to pensions, Keogh accounts, and IRA accounts. 
This remained unchanged under integration. Table 11.3  Summary Information for the Different Cases Considered 
Benchmark  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
Identifier  ...  Central  No property  r,  = .07  Lump-sum 
tax  equal yield 
Tax changes 
%  ,8222  ,8052  ,8052  ,8052  ,8052 
7  .48  ,1948  ,1948  ,1948  ,1948 
fk  *  CIT  + PFT( +  PT)  PFT'  + PT  PFT'  PFT'  + PT  PFT'  + IT 
capital income  capital income  capital income  capital income  capital income 
Sensitivity analysis 
fP  As appropriate  Real estate:  Real estate:  Real estate:  All non- 
others: half  others: half  others: half 
for comparison  nondistorting  distorting  nondistorting  nondistorting 
rz  As appropriate  .05  .05  .07  .05 
for comparison 
Extra tax for  ...  Add scalar to  Add scalar to  Add scalar to  Lump-sum tax 
equal yieldt  personal rates  personal rates  personal rates  on individuals 
*CIT = corporate income tax, PlT = personal factor tax (explained in the text), PT = property tax. Only the distorting parts of observed 1973 property tax 
revenues are added to the numerator. For case 2, no PT is in the numerator of either base or revised average tax rates. PFT' indicates a changed PFT (see 
text). 
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assumes that half of  the property tax was distorting in all industries except 
real estate, where it was assumed to be nondistorting. 
In order to make up for lost tax revenue in this simulation, we assumed 
that all personal tax rates would be raised by a uniform scalar amount. 
This  scalar  increase  in  tax  rates was  chosen  in  each period  so that 
government had just enough revenue to  attain the utility level that it had 
in the same period of  the benchmark sequence. In particular, we added 
the same scalar to the following tax rates: mj,  the personal tax rates of the 
twelve  consumer groups (j  = 1,12); m, the personal  tax rate of  pro- 
prietors; m,,  the personal tax rate of  corporate owners with integration; 
n, the implicit rate of  subsidy for purchase of  local public goods; and 
1 -  yz/~,  the implicit tax rate on municipal bonds. 
Each of the other simulations represents a slight variation from this 
central case simulation. In the second simulation, we assumed that the 
property tax was nondistorting in all industries. In this case property tax 
revenues are deleted from government revenues in both base and revised 
simulations. Property taxes are implicitly treated as benefit payments for 
public “consumer goods” or intermediate inputs in production. 
In the third simulation, we set the risk-free rate to 0.07, the Treasury 
bill rate in 1973. This change affected the parameterization of  the bench- 
mark equilibrium, which was carried through to  the new revised equilib- 
rium. 
Finally, in the fourth simulation, we assumed that any extra tax reve- 
nue needed to maintain government utility is raised through a lump-sum 
tax  on individuals.  The amount of  extra tax  paid  by  each group is 
proportional to its original after-tax income, but the extra tax has no price 
effects. While this case is unrealistic, it allows us to isolate the effects of 
changing the tax distortions on capital income. (With additions to per- 
sonal income  tax  rates, there are further distortions  in  labor-leisure 
choices.) 
11.4.4  Simulation Results 
Tables 11.4-1 1.6  present some of the information from our simulations 
of corporate and personal tax integration. As a basis of comparison, we 
extended the consistent 1973  benchmark economy to a sequence  of  seven 
equilibria spaced five years apart. Each equilibrium is proportionately 
larger than the previous one, with all values growing at the steady state 
rate. For a revised case, the first period has the same total capital as in the 
benchmark. The endogenous savings response determines capital stock 
in the six subsequent periods, again spaced five years apart. With dis- 
proportionate growth, however, we need to interpolate values for in- 
tervening years. For each variable, we calculate the annual growth rate 
implied by its values from two successive periods. This rate is applied to 407  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
Table 11.4  Equivalent Variations Relative to National Income for 
Each Year from Integration of Corporate and Personal Taxes 
(EVINI) 
No  Lump-sum 
Central  Property  r,  = .07  Equal Yield 
Case  Tax Case  Case  Case 
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the value from the first of  those periods to obtain values for each year 
between them. 
Table 11.4 presents equivalent variations for all thirty-one years, each 
measured relative to national income in the corresponding year of  the 
benchmark  simulation. The seven  actual equilibrium  calculations are 
reflected in years 1,6,  11,16,21,26, and 31, while other years’ values are 
obtained using interpolated data. 408  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
Table 11.5  Key Variables Relative to the Benchmark, Over Five Year Periods, 
for Integration of  Corporate and Personal Taxes 
(revise valudbase value) 
Risk-free 
Time  Con-  Capital  Interest 
Period  sumption  Saving  Stock  Rate 
3.  r,  = .07 case 
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Table 11.5 summarizes results by looking at just a few key variables in 
each of  the seven periods. Each entry is the ratio of the revise-case value 
to the base-case value of the same period. A capital stock ratio less than 
one, for example, does not imply reduced capital stock over time; it only 
implies less capital than in the growing benchmark sequence. 
Table 11.6  shows the reallocation of  the fixed total capital stock in the 
first period. The entry for each industry is the percent change in capital 
used in the first period of the revised sequence from the first period of the 
base sequence. 
Integration of  the corporate income tax with the personal income tax 
may seem like a dramatic change in the tax law. Indeed, Fullerton, King, 
Shoven, and Whalley (1980, 1981) find significant welfare gains from Table 11.6  Reallocation of Capital with Corporate and Personal Tax Integration: 
Percent Change from the Benchmark Use of Capital for Each Sector 
No  Lump-sum 
Central  Property  r,  = .07  Equal Yield 
Case  Tax Case  Case  Case 
Industry  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(1)  Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
(2)  Mining 
(3)  Crude petroleum and gas 
(4)  Construction 
(5)  Food and tobacco 
(6)  Textile, apparel, and leather 
(7)  Paper and printing 
(8) Petroleum refining 
(9)  Chemicals and rubber 
(10)  Lumber, furniture, stone, clay, and glass 
(11)  Metals and machinery 
(12)  Transportation equipment 
(13)  Motor vehicles 
(14)  Transportation, communication, and utilities 
(15) Trade 
(16) Finance and insurance 
(17)  Real estate 
(18) Services 
(19) Government enterprises 
(20) General government 
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integration. However, the results here indicate that the effects on the 
economy would be very modest. Except when revenues are replaced by a 
lump-sum tax, table 11.4  shows that the tax change results in a very slight 
drop in the utility from current consumption of  commodities and leisure 
during at least the first thirty years after the tax change. 
Net welfare losses occur with integration when the revenue is replaced 
by  raising  personal  tax rates, because  the labor-leisure  distortion  is 
e~acerbated.~~  This overall loss occurs in spite of  welfare improvements 
on three other margins. 
First, integration eliminates the distortion favoring debt finance, re- 
moving the leverage costs that were 0.6% of  benchmark national income. 
Second, interindustry welfare gains follow along the lines of previous 
Harberger-type analyses, as indicated in the last two columns of  table 
11.2. The generally high required rates of return in manufacturing are 
lowered, while the low required rates of return in real estate and petro- 
leum refining are raised. 
Third, there are welfare effects on the intertemporal allocation  of 
consumption. Table 11.2 shows that the average s,  is a bit higher with 
integration, whether or not the property tax was modeled as distorting. 
Integration reduces the small  net  subsidy  to the risk-free  return on 
savings, discussed in an earlier section. These three welfare effects are 
summarized in the fourth simulation of table 11.4, where revenue losses 
with integration are recovered through lump-sum taxes. Together they 
imply a slight welfare gain from integration  alone. Without  changing 
personal tax rates, labor supply remains basically unchanged. If personal 
tax rates have to rise, however, the first three columns of  table 11.4 
indicate a net welfare loss from integration. We find that the resulting 
drop in labor supply creates the largest welfare  effect.  We probably 
underestimate the welfare cost of this drop in labor supply because we 
ignore some existing distortions to labor supply created by various trans- 
fer programs such as food stamps and AFDC. In the first period of  the 
central case, labor supply drops by 1.4% in response to the 0.026 rise in 
marginal tax rates. The figures for the second and third cases are very 
similar. 
In the third case, where r, = 0.07 in the benchmark equilibrium, the 
equivalent variation figures are even less favorable. It turns out that the 
benchmark intersectoral misallocation of  capital and the intertemporal 
savings-investment distortion are slightly smaller in this case. The smaller 
gains from integration on those margins are offset by the same size loss 
from raising personal tax rates, for a larger net loss overall. 
Because of the drop  in labor supply with a fixed initial supply of  capital, 
capital-labor ratios rise in the first period in all sectors except general 
56.  When personal income tax rates are raised, the interpersonal allocation of savings is 
further distorted, as are local public goods decisions. 411  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
government. In order to encourage this increase in capital-labor ratios, 
the cost of capital must fall. The last two columns of table 11.2 show that 
with no change in interest rates, integration would imply a higher cost of 
capital on average. Therefore the market interest rate must fall initially, 
as seen in table 11.5. The lower interest rate causes a fall in savings. The 
resulting reduction in the growth rate of the capital stock allows r, to rise 
back up slightly above 0.05. 
When r,  = 0.07, however, the tax change tends to increase the cost of 
capital relatively less (since lowering (abrz)/[a(l -  T)]  to r,  becomes more 
important). In this simulation, interest rates have to rise to offset the 
stronger investment incentive resulting from the tax change. Note also 
that when labor supply does not fall, as when lump-sum taxes are used to 
replace lost tax revenue, the story is reversed. Interest rates initially rise 
in  order to maintain  an unchanged  capital-labor ratio. The resulting 
savings rate is sufficiently high, however, that interest rates must fall later 
to create demand for all the resulting capital. 
Capital-labor ratios do not rise uniformly, however. Capital is reallo- 
cated slightly across sectors in response to the tax change, as shown for 
the first period in table 11.6. Capital tends to  leave the industries that are 
little affected by the tax changes: g~vernment,~’  the primarily noncorpo- 
rate industries (1 and 17), and, to a lesser degree, industries which are 
heavily debt financed initially (16,17, and 18). The  major impetus  for this 
reallocation of  capital is the change in s,  resulting from the tax change, 
but many other factors are also involved. Included among these other 
factors are the relative size of the corporate  sector, the relative size of  the 
drop in leverage costs, and varying factor substitution elasticities in each 
industry. 
We also see from table 11.5 that current consumption (of both com- 
modities and leisure) falls eventually except when lump-sum taxes are 
used to replace lost revenue. In cases 1 and 2, this fall in consumption 
results mainly from the fall in potential output caused by the fall in the 
capital stock. In case 3 it results from the rise in interest rates which shifts 
income into savings. These current consumption figures are less interest- 
ing  than the eqivalent  variation  figures,  however,  since  they  do not 
control for the amount of risk bearing. Note that risk bearing increases 
initially (in spite of  the elimination of  leverage costs) because of  the 
reallocation of  capital toward riskier industries. 
In addition to these four simulations, we ran several others, not re- 
ported  here, which  produced very  similar  results.  In particular, the 
assumption that property taxes on housing are also half distorting made 
almost  no difference  to the results.  Also, raising  extra tax  revenues 
57.  Capital tends to leave general government in part because as personal income tax 
rates rise, its relative prices for labor and commodities (which are proportional to (1 -  n)) 
fall more than does the cost of  capital. 412  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
through a proportional rather than an additive increase in all personal tax 
rates made little difference. 
11.5  Conclusions 
Previous versions of  the FSW model have assumed that marginal tax 
rates equal average  tax  rates and that government  expenditures are 
nondistorting. In this paper we have reexamined the modeling of many of 
these marginal tax and benefit distortions. Particular attention was paid 
to the modeling of  the effect of  taxes on financial and investment deci- 
sions of  corporations and local public governments. 
We found that average tax rates provide a poor characterization of 
government-created  distortions. In the cases of  the social security, unem- 
ployment insurance, and workmen’s compensation programs, we have 
argued that individuals receive extra government benefits which would 
come close to  offsetting any extra taxes they pay on the margin, as well as 
on average. We also argued that recipients of  capital income receive 
benefits which largely compensate them for the taxes they pay and often 
more than compensate them. However, this compensation comes in a 
subtle form: these recipients are able to reduce some of the risk in the 
return on their investments by transferring it to the government through 
risky tax revenue. We also found that the tax distortion favoring corpo- 
rate use of  debt rather than equity finance is quite costly from a social 
point of  view. 
Our results also emphasize the importance of using a general equilib- 
rium  model to evaluate welfare  effects in  a second-best world. The 
current model simultaneously accounts for tax distortions in corporate 
financial decisions, in the interindustry (and private versus government) 
allocations of  labor and capital, in the intertemporal allocation of con- 
sumption, and in the 1aborAeisure choice of  individuals. Concentration 
on only some of  these distortions can give a very misleading view of  the 
effects of  integrating the corporate income tax with the personal income 
tax. In particular, we find that the extra distortion costs caused by raising 
personal income tax rates to restore government  revenue more than 
offset the efficiency gains from changing the method of taxing income 
from corporate capital through corporate tax integration. 413  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
Appendix 
Construction of  Industry-specijic Data 
Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson 
This appendix describes the procedures for obtaining four data series: 
unemployment insurance tax rates, investment tax credit rates, economic 
depreciation rates, and tax depreciation rates. 
Unemployment Insurance Tax Rates 
In the above simulations, we required the net (of benefit) unemploy- 
ment insurance tax rates for 1973 for eighteen private industries. These 
industries are for the most part aggregations of two to three SIC  two-digit 
industries in manufacturing, and broader classifications (e.g. wholesale 
and retail trade) outside of  manufacturing.  Becker’s (1972) data for 
unemployment insurance benefit and tax rates, on the other hand, came 
from sixteen state employment security agencies for various combina- 
tions of years and industries (see his tables AS  to A.9). He has provided 
information for 1961, 1967, and the 1957-67  average. Industry detail 
included broad classifications such as “manufacturing”  and “wholesale 
and retail trade,” selected two-digit industries, and selected three-digit 
industries. Typically, data for a particular industry were available for only 
a few states and not all time periods. 
In view of  the discrepancies between required and available data, we 
computed the net tax rate for each industry from the 1957-67  sample and 
the 1967 sample. The unweighted average from the two samples was 
taken as the estimate for the industry. If  the FSW industry consisted of 
several two-digit industries, this procedure was applied to each two-digit 
industry, and the average of these tax rates was used as the FSW industry 
tax rate. There were two exceptions to this general procedure caused by 
lack of  industry information. For the two mining industries, petroleum 
and natural gas and other mining, we used the same estimate, the one 
available for their total. For petroleum refining, we averaged estimates 
for two other nondurable industries, chemicals and rubber and paper and 
printing. 
Effective Investment Tax Credit Rates 
To compute the investment  tax credit rates, we divided the dollar 
amount of the credit taken in each industry by the level of investment in 
that industry. Because we were calculating effective rates, investment 
included purchases of  structures and the change in  inventories, even 
though these types of  investment are not eligible for the ITC. We were 
Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson is with the Department of Economics,  Amherst College. 414  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
forced to aggregate corporate and noncorporate data because there was 
no separate information  about investment in  these  two sectors. This 
procedure is appropriate in that the same statutory rates apply to both 
sectors, but may be inaccurate if the type of  investment differs between 
the corporate and noncorporate sectors of an industry. 
Tables on the investment tax credit by industry appear in the Internal 
Revenue Service Statistics of  Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 
but the ITC for sole proprietors and partners does not appear in the 
Statistics of  Income publications for these returns. Unpublished data on 
the 1973  noncorporate ITC  were made available by the Treasury Depart- 
ment, and we used the assumption of a constant ratio of noncorporate to 
corporate ITC in each industry to estimate the noncorporate ITC for 
1974. These data were then aggregated to our industry definitions for 
each of  the two years. 
Our principal source for data on fixed investment by industry was the 
Commerce  Department’s survey  of  expenditures for  new  plant  and 
equipment by United States business, as reported in the Survey of  Cur- 
rent Business (SCB).  Supplementary unpublished data were provided by 
the Bureau of  Economic  Analysis (BEA) of the Commerce  Department. 
The  coverage of this survey was satisfactory for our manufacturing indus- 
tries and for transportation, communications, and utilities. Information 
on other industries was inadequate for various reasons: agricultural busi- 
ness and housing are excluded entirely from the survey, some service 
industries are omitted, and investment in mining is underreported be- 
cause capital expenditures for unsuccessful mineral explorations are ex- 
pensed rather than being included as an investment on company books. 
As a result, we used several different procedures for obtaining invest- 
ment in these remaining industries. For real estate, we used the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) figures for residential investment. 
This omits the relatively small nonresidential investment by this industry 
(brokers’ offices),  but we  were not  able to find  information  on this 
component. For agriculture, we used NIPA data on investment in agri- 
cultural  machinery  and  nonresidential  farm  structures.  Agricultural 
machinery is only part of  the equipment purchased by farmers, and the 
rest  (tractors, trucks, automobiles, etc.) is not broken down between 
agricultural and nonagricultural uses on an annual basis. We scaled up 
our estimate of  equipment spending to total agricultural equipment in 
both years using information from the 1972 capital flow table (CFT) of 
BEA. For the remaining industries, we used the CFT data for 1972, 
multiplied by growth rates for the closest corresponding category from 
the 1973 and 1974 investment surveys. 
Inventory investment estimates  for agriculture and trade came directly 
from the SCB (tables 1.1  and 5.8, respectively). For other industries, we 
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valuation adjustment (IVA). BEA provided  unpublished  data for the 
IVA (consistent with table 6.16 of the SCB)  for each of our industries for 
1973. The 1974 IVAs were estimated using growth rates in the IVA for 
broad industry classifications (such as “durable  manufacturing”) from 
table 5.8 of the SCB.58  The change in the book value of  inventories came 
from the Census Bureau’s monthly report on Manufacturers’ Shipments, 
Inventories, and Orders, available from Data Resources, Inc. In some 
cases, it was necessary to impute data for two-digit manufacturing indus- 
tries and nonmanufacturing industries. This was done using information 
on the size of the industry as measured by investment in the 1972 CFT, as 
well as information on inventory change in table 5.8 of  the SCB. 
Economic Depreciation Rates 
As described in  section  11.2.3 above, economic depreciation  rates 
were  found for each  industry  by  calculating  the rate that was  most 
consistent with the dollar value of  economic depreciation for the period 
1972 to 1974 and the stream of  investment through 1974. 
For economic depreciation in twelve two-digit and three-digit manu- 
facturing industries, we used the “variant C” estimates of  Coen (1980), 
which are provided through 1974. For agriculture and real estate we used 
the Commerce Department’s capital consumption allowances with capi- 
tal consumption adjustment from the SCB, tables 1.13, 6.15, and 6.24. 
Estimates of  economic depreciation rates were not available for more 
than these fourteen industries, but a procedure to extend depreciation 
rates to other industries is described below. 
The data for nominal fixed investment described in the previous section 
(on investment tax credit rates) were extended back to 1947, and the 
price deflator for fixed investment from the National Income Accounts 
was used to convert those figures to constant dollars for the appropriate 
year  (i = 1972, 1973,  1974). This was  not  possible  for all  industries, 
however. The investment survey data described in the previous section 
were available from Data Resources, Inc., for sixteen two-digit industries 
since 1947 (including the twelve manufacturing industries). For the real 
estate industry, we were  able to use  the NIPA data discussed  in the 
previous  section.  For  agriculture,  we  had  investment  in  agricultural 
machinery since 1947, but information on nonfarm structures was avail- 
able only back to 1958. We extended the latter to 1947 by assuming that it 
was 0.77 of the former, a figure based on the ratios for 1958, 1959, and 
1960. 
We still had to account for the (small) amount of  the capital stock in 
58.  Both  tables  5.8  and  6.16 of  the  SCB provide  data  on the  inventory  valuation 
adjustment, but  are  taken  from different sources. Table  5.8 estimates  are used  in the 
product side of the GNP accounts, while table 6.16 estimates are used for the income side. 
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1972 to 1974 that was the result of investment prior to 1947. Using NIPA 
data, we estimated that real nonresidential fixed investment increased at 
a 2.7% rate between 1929 and 1947, and real residential investment at a 
2.1% rate, and applied these aggregate growth rates as described in the 
text. 
Using the above information, we computed economic depreciation 
rates for fourteen industries. Some of the eighteen FSW industries corre- 
spond exactly to these industries. Some are aggregates of these available 
industries,  and we  computed economic  depreciation  rates for  these 
aggregates. 
For industries for which  we had no depreciation  data, we  inferred 
information on the durability of  their capital stock from data on their 
relative purchases of  structures and equipment, as reported in the 1972 
BEA CFT, which was available for all of our disaggregated industries. 
We used our estimated depreciation  rates for available two-digit  and 
three-digit industries, agriculture, and real estate in a regression on the 
ratios of  equipment to total plant and equipment (and the square of that 
ratio). This regression  gave us a predictive  equation for depreciation 
rates of other two-digit industries based on their ratios of  equipment to 
total plant and equipment. If  one of the model's industries was entirely 
unrepresented in the available depreciation rate estimates, we used the 
predicted  rate based on its 1972 CFT data. If  part of  an industry was 
represented in the available depreciation rate estimates, we used that 
estimate in combination with a prediction for the other part, weighting by 
the value of  the capital stock in 1972 in each section of  the industry. 
Since a published estimate of  the capital stock was not available for 
each two-digit industry, we  estimated each capital stock ourselves. In 
particular, if d is our estimate for the economic depreciation rate in a 
particular industry, if p  is the estimated growth rate in real investment in 
that industry during the period  1947 to 1972, and if  ZR is the real gross 
fixed investment in the industry in  1972, then the capital stock in the 
industry in 1972 is approximated by 
Where an industry's growth rate of investment was unavailable, we used 
a growth rate based on more aggregated data (e.g. manufacturing). 
Tax Depreciation Rates 
The methodology for computing tax depreciation rates was similar to 
the methodology for economic depreciation: we searched for the rate in 
each industry that was consistent with observed depreciation allowances 
and investment streams. The  data for depreciation allowances came from 
the IRS Statistics of  Zncorne for both corporate and noncorporate enter- 417  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
prises, by industry. For real estate and agriculture, we used SCB tables 
6.15 and 6.24. The rates for industries for which investment data were 
missing were derived in a manner similar to the economic depreciation 
rates, by regressions using the ratio of equipment to total investment. 
The  main difference in the methodology from that for economic depre- 
ciation rates was that we accounted for major changes in tax laws regard- 
ing depreciation allowances. In particular, prior to 1954, firms could use 
straight-line depreciation based on Bulletin F lifetimes. In 1954, double 
declining balance or sum of the years’ digits methods of  tax depreciation 
were introduced, and in 1971, tax lifetimes were reduced by 20% through 
the asset depreciation range (ADR) system. In each of these periods, 
therefore, the tax depreciation  rate was  different.  We proceeded by 
calculating how the effective geometric depreciation rates would differ 
among these periods for a representative asset with a fourteen year tax 
lifetime prior to ADR. Suppose investment in this asset had been grow- 
ing continuously at the nominal rate p = 0.07 (calculated by regressing 
the log of  the NIPA total fixed nonresidential investment from 1947 to 
1976 on time). Then under the double declining balance formula, tax 
depreciation deductions in year i would be 
where  Zi is  nominal  investment  in  year  i.  The equivalent  geometric 
depreciation rate would be that rate d’ which would have implied the 
same size of  tax deductions. With geometric depreciation,  tax deductions 
would have been 
When we equate these two formulas and use  T = 14 and  p.  = 0.07, the 
only remaining unknown is d’.  We therefore conclude that the effective 
depreciation rate for this representative asset would have been 0.162 for 
the period  1954-70.  After  1971, when  T was  reduced  by  20%, the 
effective rate implied by the above formulas increased to 0.205. 
In contrast, with straight-line depreciation, tax deductions would have 
been 
Therefore the effective geometric depreciation rate for this representa- 
tive asset prior to 1954 would have been 0.123. 418  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
On  the basis of  these results, we assumed in our calculations that if  the 
effective geometric depreciation  rate d'  was available on investments 
made since 1971, then the rate 0.789d' was available during the period 
1954-70,  and the rate 0.600d'  during the period  prior to 1954.sy  We 
recognize that our procedure omits the effects of  many other revisions 
during the period both in Treasury Depapment rulings and in the degree 
to which firms took advantage of the available rulings. A more thorough 
procedure, for example, might use information from Vasquez (1974) on 
the proportion of  investment that was depreciated by the faster methods 
allowed following the 1954 and 1971 changes in the law. Our procedure 
should effectively capture the basic differences in the tax treatment of 
depreciation among the various industries, which is what we needed. 
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Comment  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
Fullerton and Gordon’s objective in this paper is to develop a descendent 
of  the Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (FSW) general equilibrium model and 
use it to simulate the effects of  integration of the income taxes. Their 
primary contribution lies in the attempt to incorporate in the model an 
improved description of  corporate and noncorporate financial policy. A 
more realistic  description  of  corporate financial policy  is,  of  course, 
necessary if  one is to analyze adequately the effects of  integration, one 
primary benefit of  which is neutrality toward corporate financial policy. 
This modification allows the authors to incorporate in their analysis the 
government’s  sharing in risk  initially taken in  the private  sector. By 
comparison, most of the previous empirical attempts to implement the 
Harberger model, such as those by FSW, have examined a riskless world. 
Fullerton and Gordon also employ the same basic theoretical framework 
to analyze the financial decisions of  government enterprises and of  gen- 
eral government. A distinctly subsidiary effort involves consideration of 
marginal  benefits  of  public spending as potential  offsets to marginal 
taxes. 
One must be impressed with the ambitiousness of what Fullerton and 
Gordon have attempted in the analysis reported here. To some extent 
they have “only” brought together and included in their model disparate 
threads of literature in public and corporate finance. Of course, this is a 
major undertaking in itself. But in other cases-especially in the analysis 
of government activities-they  have had to attempt entirely new analyses 
of  largely unexplored problems in order to flesh out their model. 
While one must commend Fullerton and Gordon for their daring, it is 
not clear that they have been uniformly successful in all their pioneering 
efforts, or even in their eclecticism. Most of  my remarks will focus on 
what I perceive to be shortcomings of  Fullerton and Gordon’s analysis 
rather than on the many manifest contributions of this paper. 
Tax-induced Leverage 
Fullerton and Gordon go well beyond earlier attempts to incorporate 
the financial decisions of  firms in general equilibrium models. In particu- 
lar, much  is made-and  properly  so-of the public’s sharing of  risk, 
including  that of  bankruptcy, through  the tax system. It is here that 
Fullerton and Gordon’s major contribution  lies.  Yet  one must  note 
several deficiencies in their analysis. 
First, the authors choose to illustrate the capability of their model by 
Charles E. McLure, Jr., is  a senior fellow at  the Hoover Institution and a research 
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examining full integration  under the partnership approach. This is a 
useful exercise; since so much has been made of  the potential welfare 
gains from eliminating the distortions of  corporate financial structures 
induced by the unintegrated taxation of corporate equity income, it is 
good to know that these gains would be roughly offset if  revenues lost in 
integration were made up by raising taxes that further distort the labor- 
leisure choice. But one must wish that the authors had also examined the 
effects of  providing only relief from double taxation of dividends, since 
complete integration is commonly agreed to be administratively difficult, 
if  not impossible, and very unlikely to occur. That would, of course, be 
much more complicated to model, since it would necessitate addressing 
head-on the crucial question of the treatment of  tax preferences. 
Second, one cannot adequately model tax effects on decisions in the 
important petroleum industry without considering (a) tax preferences 
peculiar to that industry, such as the depletion allowance and the expens- 
ing  of  intangible  drilling  costs,  and  (b)  the foreign tax  credit. (See 
McLure 1979, chapters 4  and 6.) The effect of  the preferences in reducing 
average tax rates in this industry is well known; but what is the effect at 
the margin? (Harberger 1966 included petroleum in the noncorporate 
sector in his two-sector analysis of the efficiency effects of capital taxes.) 
One cannot fault Fullerton and Gordon for choosing not to consider 
foreign tax issues in detail. But in the petroleum industry the existence of 
surplus foreign tax credits (FTC) implies that domestic activities in this 
industry effectively carry a marginal tax rate near zero. These omissions 
become especially important when one considers integration of  the in- 
come taxes. Would integration, if  complete, involve passing the prefer- 
ences and the foreign tax credit through to individual shareholders, or 
would the preferences and FTC be eliminated? If dividend relief were at 
stake, how would these tax preferences and the FTC be treated? 
A number of  minor points must be noted about Fullerton and Gor- 
don’s treatment of  leverage costs and risk: 
The calculation of  industry-specific risk  premiums on equity seems 
inconsistent  with  the use  of  a common risk  premium  for debt. One 
wonders how likely it is that risk premiums on the two types of securities 
issued in the same industry would not be highly correlated. I am dis- 
appointed that the authors felt it necessary to use a common risk pre- 
mium for the bonds of all industries. 
Fullerton and Gordon go to  great lengths to tell elaborate stories about 
leverage in the corporate and government sectors. By comparison, they 
assume only equity finance in the noncorporate sector. Their brief discus- 
sion of  this in a footnote leaves the reader wanting a more complete 
explanation. 
Fullerton and Gordon assume that capital is just as risky at  the margin 
as is existing capital, so that the optimal debt-capital ratio is the same 423  A Reexamination of Tax Distortions 
for marginal investment as for prior investments. But this seems quite 
unlikely. 
Through their assumption of  uncertainty and no constraint on short 
sales the authors reject various theories that imply clientele effects and 
justify the repeated use of  weighted averages of  tax rates.  Given the 
existence of  constraints on  short sales one must wonder whether much of 
the paper should not be recast in terms of  (for example) marginal tax 
rates of  marginal investors rather than averages of marginal tax rates. 
This is  especially  relevant  since their approach forces Fullerton  and 
Gordon to assume that the marginal personal tax rates of  investors in the 
corporate and noncorporate sectors are not affected by integration. It is 
thought by  some that existing patterns of  ownership of  assets reflect 
current taxation and that they-and  related marginal tax rates-would 
change in response to integration. 
Tax-exempt organizations play no role in this analysis, except as con- 
duits for the saving of  individuals. Is that appropriate, or should these 
organizations be assumed to have investment objectives of  their own? 
Does the answer differ, depending on whether pension funds, universi- 
ties, or foundations are concerned? 
Benefit Taxation 
Fullerton and Gordon claim that they model the distorting effects of 
government activity more accurately than do FSW by considering mar- 
ginal increases in benefits that may offset marginal increases in taxes. 
This is clearly a worthwhile objective, since little is to be gained from 
treating taxes that are linked directly to benefits as distortionary levies. 
However, I find part of  their  discussion  of  which taxes are offset by 
benefits at the margin inadequate and some of  their decisions on the 
matter arbitrary and questionable. 
Fullerton and Gordon treat personal and corporate income taxes and 
various indirect taxes as “real” taxes. By comparison, they assume that 
the residential property tax only reflects benefits of public services. Thus 
they do not treat it as a distortionary tax. Though I would argue that this 
conclusion is not totally accurate, it is probably closer to the truth than 
the polar opposite assumption that residential property taxes buy noth- 
ing. Whether it can be said that nonresidential property taxes are also 
benefit taxes is unclear. Personally, I doubt it. But the authors’ argument 
that once investment has been made nonresidential capital can be taxed 
by  local  governments with  relative impunity seems oddly inconsistent 
with  the instantaneous equilibration  implicit  in their formal model of 
capital allocation. On  the other hand, since property taxes are deductible 
in calculating federal income tax liability, the pressure on local govern- 
ments to  provide a quid pro quo for property taxes paid is less than in the 
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Fullerton and Gordon argue that competition  between  states and 
localities will assure that property taxes merely reflect benefits. But I am 
not sure that they should limit the argument to property taxes, especially 
since the apportionment formulas  used in state corporate income taxes to 
allocate total income among states ordinarily give a weight of one-third  to 
property in the state. Similarly, why are all state and local indirect taxes 
and personal income taxes treated as unrequited levies rather than bene- 
fit taxes? Though the formal conditions required for an assumption of 
benefit taxation are less fully met in these instances than in the case of 
property taxes, I believe that some of the same economic forces that lead 
to classification of residential property taxes as benefit taxes would prob- 
ably also lead to qualitatively similar results for general sales taxes and 
income taxes. Finally, Fullerton and Gordon treat all excises as taxes that 
increase production costs, even though the most important of  these, the 
levies on motor fuels, are arguably benefit taxes levied for the construc- 
tion and maintenance of  highways. 
In short, what Fullerton and Gordon have done to extend the FSW 
model  by incorporating  recent work  on taxes and corporate financial 
policy is impressive and important. By comparison, their treatment of  the 
benefit offsets to taxation is more debatable. This is especially unfortu- 
nate, since they tend to give these more questionable assumptions equal 
billing  with  their important work  on  tax-induced effects on financial 
policy and the public sharing of private risk. 
Having said all that, one wonders whether it really matters. After all, 
the conceptual experiment being simulated is the replacement of one tax 
with  another. Since the tax change  under examination  would  almost 
certainly  affect corporate financial  policy,  incorporating  the financial 
decision in the model is crucial. But the taxes involved in the experiments 
in differential analysis are not said to be benefit taxes. Thus it appears on 
a priori grounds that it would make very little difference for tax incidence 
how the taxes that may be benefit taxes are treated. On the other hand, 
since welfare effects are proportional to squares of  distortions, the same 
cannot necessarily be said of them. At several points the authors provide 
useful sensitivity analysis of how welfare effects depend on their treat- 
ment of  property taxes. 
The Government Sector 
Fullerton and Gordon are forced by their desire for completeness, as 
well as by methodological necessity, to consider explicitly two compo- 
nents of the public sector, government enterprises and general govern- 
ment. There are, however, questionable aspects of both treatments. 
The Fullerton and Gordon treatment of  government enterprise does 
not involve including in their model standard results from the literature 
on government enterprises. Rather, it is simply a mechanical adaptation 425  A Reexamination of  Tax Distortions 
of their private-sector modeling of  risk taking and investment. While one 
cannot necessarily expect a full-blown theory of public enterprise, one 
must be a bit uneasy about casually assuming that public firms follow so 
closely in the assumed footprints of  private firms. Particularly trouble- 
some is the modeling of  leverage costs; though public enterprises rarely 
founder, the risk of bankruptcy  in the public sector may not be negligible, 
and it may be different in kind from that in the private sector. Thus it 
seems unlikely that correcting the average private risk premium to ab- 
stract from risk of  bankruptcy gives an accurate estimate of the appropri- 
ate risk  premium  to use for  either government enterprises or general 
government. 
The Fullerton and Gordon treatment of  general government is even 
more questionable. First,  it may be true that 72% of  all government 
capital occurs in the state and local area. But through its budget deficits 
and the need to refinance  the national  debt the federal  government 
generates enormous demands for financial  capital.  Beyond  that, the 
treatment of governmental demand for labor in the model is sketchy, at 
best. 
Second, Fullerton and Gordon assume, without adequate justification, 
that government revenues adjust so that government utility, given by a 
Cobb-Douglas function, remains constant, despite tax-induced changes 
in relative prices. This approach is questionable on several grounds. Most 
basically, the notion that government derives utility directly, rather than 
meeting the demands of consumers and producers for public services, is 
quite extreme. Moreover, it  is  inconsistent  to treat much  of  general 
government (especially local government financed by property taxes) as 
supplying goods and services in response to benefit-related taxes, without 
including those goods and services in the utility functions of households 
or  in the production functions of firms. Finally, except under very special 
assumptions, the assumption that government’s utility remains constant 
when taxes are changed is not a satisfactory shortcut to assuming that the 
utility individuals receive from government services remains constant. 
A final extreme assumption that deserves attention is the fixing of the 
real value of  transfers in the face of  tax-induced changes in consumer 
prices. As Browning (1978; Browning and Johnson 1979) has shown, this 
assumption can have dramatic effects on results of incidence analysis. But 
whether it is defensible is another issue. One must wonder whether this 
assumption  is  significantly  more innocuous  in  the present context  of 
analysis of  the welfare costs of  taxation. 
Other Matters 
The treatment of personal saving behavior seems rather odd. Fullerton 
and Gordon seem to be saying that individuals allocate a given percent- 
age of saving to  pensions, Keogh plans, and related tax preferred savings 426  Don Fullerton/Roger H. Gordon 
vehicles and then allocate the rest of  saving between taxable and tax- 
exempt securities on the basis of the rate of  return. This description of 
behavior  is suspect on several counts. First, why do they choose this 
partioning between fixed allocations and allocations that depend on rates 
of  return? Is the first split really independent of  tax considerations? 
Fullerton and Gordon employ a standard 70-30  split between taxable 
and exempt forms of saving. But some forms of exempt saving, such as 
IRAs, have statutory dollar  limits.  Thus one wonders  if  this  split is 
appropriate at the margin. If it is not, the use of weights of 70% and 30% 
in calculating the average of  marginal tax rates of investors is inappropri- 
ate. Finally, does it matter whether “pensions” are defined benefit plans 
or  defined contribution  plans? I can imagine that the individual may have 
considerable discretion over whether to invest in the latter. But I doubt 
that the same discretion exists so far as defined benefit plans are con- 
cerned. 
Fullerton and Gordon deal quite summarily with what appears to be a 
major problem, cases in which their calculation of  the demand for labor 
in the noncorporate sector produces a negative number. They apparently 
get around this by aggregating corporate and noncorporate labor and 
capital in each industry before inserting their values into the production 
function. Such an approach does, of  course, imply a rather strange theory 
of  production at the firm level. 
It is surprising that after making so much  fuss over the difference 
between average and marginal tax rates Fullerton and Gordon do not 
provide more information about differences in these rates. It would be 
interesting,  for example, to know (a)  how average and marginal tax rates 
differ, for each industry, (6)  the primary sources of the differences, and 
(c)  how much the difference makes for the effects of  the tax changes 
under examination. 
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